Bøger i Econometric Society Monographs serien

This book addresses one of the major theoretical issues that underlies, implicitly or explicitly, some recurrent controversies in macroeconomics - namely, whether a competitive monetary economy has built-in mechanisms that are strong enough to remove excess demands and supplies on all markets, through an automatic adjustment of the price system.

This book reviews the basic econometric methods that have been used to analyze panel data - in other words, data collected by observing a number of individuals over time.

This book examines whether continuous-time models in frictionless financial economies can be well approximated by discrete-time models. Mainstream financial economists and economic theorists who want to understand important ideas and results from the highly mathematical literature of financial mathematics will find this book an invaluable aid.

An introduction to the modern theory of economic design, this book develops an up-to-date treatment of the adjudication of conflicting claims. In addition to covering all aspects of claims problems, it links claims problems with other economic literatures, most prominently the game theory literature.

Compte and Postlewaite propose novel methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling, without complex mathematics. An accessible text that proposes a constructive critique of the discipline, and that will find a broad audience with readers who build or use economic models, and those just interested in the discipline.

Random set theory is fundamental to mathematical analysis in econometrics and finance. This is the first book dedicated to the use of the theory in econometrics. Written by leading figures and experts in this area, this book will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in econometrics.

This book presents a statistical theory for a class of nonlinear time-series models. It has particular relevance for the modeling of volatility in financial time series but the overall approach will be of interest to econometricians and statisticians in a variety of disciplines.

Students in both social and natural sciences often seek regression methods to explain the frequency of events, such as visits to a doctor, auto accidents, or new patents awarded. The second edition provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of models and methods to interpret such data.

This investigation proposes a conceptual framework for measurement necessary for an analysis of household finance and economic development. The authors apply corporate financial accounting and create financial accounts for households, using an integrated household survey. The authors also illustrate how to apply the accounts to an analysis of household finance.

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.

This volume includes papers delivered at the Fourth World Congress of the Econometric Society. It will interest economic theorists and econometricians working in universities, government, and business and financial institutions.

At the Fourth World Congress of the Econometric Society, a number of Symposia were held at which invited papers were given. The purpose of these Symposia was to survey as completely as possible those areas in Economic Theory and Econometrics where important research had come to light during the last few years. This volume includes papers delivered at the Congress.

This book describes classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, critiques thereof, and alternative theories. It discusses the meaning of probability, focusing on the behavioral definition of subjective probability by Savage's theorem. It presents non-additive and multiple prior theories, as well as the case-based approach to the formation of beliefs.

This 2007 book provides a systematic account of the fast-developing theory of complex social networks. Starting with a discussion of the basic 'benchmark' models for the complex-network literature: random networks, small worlds, and scale-free networks, the book then considers the three forces that underlie network phenomena in social contexts: diffusion, search, and play.

This study, first published in 2006, asks whether democracy, modeled as competition between political parties that represent different interests in the polity, will result in educational funding policies that will, at least eventually, produce citizens who have equal capacities (human capital), thus breaking the link between family background and child prospects.

This book examines the consequences of misspecifications from the fundamental to the nonexistent for the interpretation of likelihood-based methods of statistical estimation and interference.

These twenty papers were selected by the author. The book includes a major introduction by Werner Hildenbrand, who assesses Professor Debreu's contribution to economic theory and explains the part played by these papers in the development of the subject.

In this book Andreu Mas-Colell brings together work on economic theory written over the last twenty years, based upon his pioneering work in the use of differential topology in the analysis of general equilibrium. The analysis is presented in a way which makes it accessible to the broader range of economic theorists and advanced students.

This book presents an exploration of the idea of the common or social good, extended so that alternatives with different populations can be ranked. The approach is, in the main, welfarist, basing rankings on the well-being, broadly conceived, of those who are alive (or ever lived).

Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making provides a unified and comprehensive study of welfarism, cooperative games, public decision making, and voting and social choice theory - technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.

These essays by Clive W. J. Granger span more than four decades and cover major topics in spectral analysis, seasonality, nonlinearity, methodology, and forecasting. The introduction by Eric Gysels, Norman R. Swanson and Mark W. Watson places the essays in context and demonstrates their enduring value.

Quantiles provide a natural description of statistical variability in diverse populations; quantile regression offers a unified statistical methodology for studying how these measures of diversity depend upon other influences.

The definition and measurement of social welfare have been a vexed issue for the past century. This book makes a constructive, easily applicable proposal and suggests how to evaluate the economic situation of a society in a way that gives priority to the worse-off and that respects each individual's preferences over his or her own consumption, work, leisure and so on. This approach resonates with the current concern to go 'beyond the GDP' in the measurement of social progress. Compared to technical studies in welfare economics, this book emphasizes constructive results rather than paradoxes and impossibilities, and shows how one can start from basic principles of efficiency and fairness and end up with concrete evaluations of policies. Compared to more philosophical treatments of social justice, this book is more precise about the definition of social welfare and reaches conclusions about concrete policies and institutions only after a rigorous derivation from clearly stated principles.

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

This book presents the econometric analysis of single-equation and simultaneous-equation models in which the jointly dependent variables can be continuous, categorical, or truncated. Despite the traditional emphasis on continuous variables in econometrics, many of the economic variables encountered in practice are categorical (those for which a suitable category can be found but where no actual measurement exists) or truncated (those that can be observed only in certain ranges). Such variables are involved, for example, in models of occupational choice, choice of tenure in housing, and choice of type of schooling. Models with regulated prices and rationing, and models for program evaluation, also represent areas of application for the techniques presented by the author.

Pioneered by American economist Paul Samuelson, revealed preference theory is based on the idea that the preferences of consumers are revealed in their purchasing behavior. Researchers in this field have developed complex and sophisticated mathematical models to capture the preferences that are 'revealed' through consumer choice behavior. This study of consumer demand and behavior is closely tied up with econometrics (especially nonparametric econometrics), where testing the validity of different theoretical models is an important aspect of research. The theory of revealed preference has a very long and distinguished tradition in economics, but there was no systematic presentation of the theory until now. This book deals with basic questions in economic theory, such as the relation between theory and data, and studies the situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known theories in economics.

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

The most common mode of analysis in economic theory is to assume equilibrium. Yet, without a proper theory of how economies behave in disequilibrium, there is no foundation for such a practice. In this 1984 book, a review of the existing literature on the stability of general equilibrium is followed by the proposal of a more satisfactory general model for analysis.

This book comprises the second volume of papers examining the latest developments in economic theory given at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of the most recent advances in economic theory.

This first volume includes papers presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.