Bøger i History of Military Aviation serien

Offers a conceptual approach to warfare that emphasizes airpower's unique capability to achieve strategic effects. Six world-leading theorists argue that a viable strategy must transcend the purely military sphere, view the adversary as a multi-dimensional system, and pursue systemic paralysis and strategic effects rather than military destruction or attrition.

From Kites to Cold War tells the story of the evolution of manned airborne reconnaissance, born of a desire for military commanders to see the terrain ahead and gain foreknowledge of enemy intent.

Examines the relationships between air-intelligence organizations and key decision-makers. The book's analysis spans from pre-war planning and doctrine development, through the Eighth Air Force's independent air campaign, and culminates with the formation of the US Strategic Air Forces and its 1944 pre-invasion preparations.

Examines the Allied air war against France, especially from April through June 1944. During this period, General Dwight David Eisenhower, as Allied Supreme Commander, took control of all American, British, and Canadian air units, including the heavy bombers of RAF Bomber Command and the United States Army Strategic Air Forces.

Chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by US Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT).

A biography of Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, a key figure in the early development of airpower. The book highlights Brooke-Popham's role in developing the first modern military logistic system, the creation of the Royal Air Force Staff College and the organisational arrangements that underpinned Fighter Command's success in the Battle of Britain.

Airpower in the War against ISIS chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT). Benjamin S. Lambeth contends that the war's costly and excessive duration resulted from CENTCOM's inaccurate assessment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), determining it was simply a resurrected Iraqi insurgency rather than recognizing it as the emerging proto-state that it actually was. This erroneous decision, Lambeth argues, saw the application of an inappropriate counterinsurgency strategy and use of rules of engagement that imposed needless restrictions on the most effective use of the precision air assets at CENTCOM's disposal. The author, through expert analysis of recent history, forcefully argues that CENTCOM erred badly by not using its ample air assets at the outset not merely for supporting Iraq's initially noncombat-ready ground troops but also in an independent and uncompromising strategic interdiction campaign against ISIS's most vital center-of-gravity targets in Syria from the effort's first moments onward.

During the first half of the1970s, two new fighter aircraft entered operational service in the United States: TheNavysGrumman F-14 Tomcatandthe AirForcesMcDonnell Douglas F-15Eagle. Thesetwo aircraftwere part ofthe backboneof the tactical air power of the UnitedStates;theirintroduction was accompanied by comprehensive reforms in pilottraining as well as new technologies and weapon systems.Inaddition to the tactical significance of the two aircraft as innovative fighting platforms,however,their development and deploymentshould be viewed within abroadgeopolitical and geostrategic context. Tovyexplains how the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle were an integral part of the aerialcomponentof the conventional arms race within the Cold War.He argues that the trend of Soviet advanced weapon systems development created aperceptionof threat to the United States, challenging its conventional military power.Tomcats and Eaglesexplores how the Vietnam War accelerated the need for advanced fighter-interceptors, and that the lessons learned from aerial combat in Vietnam had a significant impact on the design and operational characteristics of the F-15.The author reveals that after F-14s were sold to Iran and F-15s to Israel in the second half of the 1970s, thesejets were integrated into their armed forces, leading to Israels use of the F-15 during the First Lebanese War. Finally,the authorprovides an in-depth look at the operation of the F-14 and F-15 in U.S. actions inSoutheast Asia, beginning with the Tanker Wars in the mid-1980s, throughOperationDesert Storm and Operation EnduringFreedom,andending with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

At the Dawn of Airpower: The U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps' Approach to the Airplane, 1907-1917examines the development of aviation in the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps from their first official steps into aviation up to the United States' declaration of war against Germany inApril,1917.Burkeexplainswhyeach of the services wantedairplanesandshowhowthey developedtheir respective air arms and the doctrine that guided them. His narrative follows aviation developments closely, delving deep into the official and personal papers ofthoseinvolved andteasing out the ideas and intents ofthe early pioneers whodrovemilitaryaviationBurke also closely examines the consequences of both accidental and conscious decisions on the development of the nascent aviation arms. Certainly, the slow advancement of the technology of the airplane itself in the United States (compared to Europe) in this period affected the creation of doctrine in this period. Likewise, notions that the war that broke out in 1914 was strictly a European concern, reinforced by President Woodrow Wilson's intentions to keep the United States out of that war, meant that the U.S. military had no incentive to "e;keep up"e; with European military aviation. Ultimately, however, he concludes that it was the respective services' inability to create a strong, durable network connecting those flying the airplanes regularly (technology advocates) with the senior officers exercising control over their budget and organization (technology patrons) that hindered military aviation during this period.

Rise of the War Machines: The Birth of Precision Bombing in World War II examines the rise of autonomy in air warfare from the inception of powered flight through the first phase of the Combined Bomber Offensive in World War II. Raymond P. O'Mara builds a conceptual model of humans, machines, and doctrine that demonstrates a distinctly new way of waging warfare in human-machine teams. Specifically, O'Mara examines how the U.S. Army's quest to control the complex technological and doctrinal system necessary to execute the strategic bombing mission led to the development of automation in warfare. Rise of the War Machines further explores how the process of sharing both physical and cognitive control of the precision bombing system established distinct human-machine teams with complex human-to- human and human-to-machine social relationships. O'Mara presents the precision bombing system as distinctly socio-technical, constructed of interdependent specially trained roles (the pilot, navigator, and bombardier); purpose-built automated machines (the Norden bombsight, specialized navigation tools, and the Minneapolis-Honeywell C-1 Autopilot); and the high-altitude, daylight bombing doctrine, all of which mutually shaped each other's creation and use.