Bøger i Law and Philosophy Library serien

In this thought-provoking book, yoüll find timeless questions explored through a fresh lens. First delving into the profound significance of Socrates¿ dialogical method and the inescapable nature of conflict, it ponders the rational capacities of humanity in terms of establishing harmonious communities. But this isn¿t merely a philosophical debate; it¿s a pragmatic exploration of real-world challenges.No longer limiting itself to abstract theories, the book then seeks to navigate the practical terrain of science and politics. Drawing inspiration from Aristotle, renowned for his investigations into the intricate connections between theory, technology, ethics, and politics, it tackles the essential question: How can we reconcile divergent views?At the book¿s core lies Aristotle¿s revolutionary concept of dialogue, which portrays truth as a delicate equilibrium between opposing forces, transcending the rigid boundaries of true and false. Join this captivating journey as the author reveals the hidden paths to meaningful coexistence in a world filled with conflicting perspectives.

Legal Positivism has been the dominant school of legal philosophy for much of the last century, despite its many critics. Its central tenet has long been that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. This book provides a broad but clear and jargon-free account of the central objections to the theory and why those objections are sufficient to show that legal positivism is no longer tenable. This includes a broad critique of the purported distinction method of legal positivism, the idea of ¿conceptual analysis,¿ as well as a detailed assessment of the most influential of all legal positivist theories, that of H.L.A. Hart. The book also provides a defense of the natural law school, which holds in contrast to legal positivism that the authority of law arises from its intrinsic connection to morality. The author demonstrates that most of the criticism of the natural law school arises from a caricatured account of that doctrine, for instance the idea that it requires substantive theological commitments or particular conceptions of human nature. In contrast, the author presents an account of natural law theory that is grounded in a commitment to moral truth, but not to any theological beliefs. The nature of law can only be understood in terms of its moral function, to provide a clear set of moral rules that are required for a society to function effectively.

This volume explores the concepts of legal power and legal competence in fourteen original, cutting-edge chapters by leading legal theorists. Legal power and legal competence are major topics in jurisprudence, as they concern a range of practices, common to all modern legal systems, that empower individuals to bring about changes in the respective system by changing their own legal position or the legal positions of others. This compilation covers five broad themes. The chapters in the first section address open questions on the meaning of legal power and legal competence, while those in the second tackle problems regarding their normativity. The third section is devoted to specifically exploring the relationship between legal power and constitutive norms. The fourth focuses on the analysis of legal officials and legal offices, while the fifth and final section assesses various theories of legal power and legal competence.

What does it mean that human rights derive from human dignity? And what is the foundation of human dignity? How are human dignity and its foundation connected? Is the recent development of natural sciences dealing with human nature, like evolutionary psychology, relevant to these questions? The book addresses these points by connecting the discussion on the foundations of human rights with the recent claims regarding human nature made in evolutionary psychology, and with contemporary analytic metaphysics, especially the relation of metaphysical grounding. It offers in-depth insights into the so-called naturalistic approach to human rights, together with detailed proposals on how the approach could be truly naturalized in the philosophical sense. It shows how human rights and human dignity may have foundations in natural facts about human nature and offers a detailed analysis of how the ¿is¿ / ¿ought¿ gap problematic can be solved.The book also addressesthe objection of Western ethnocentrism ¿ unlike most of the contemporary philosophical accounts of human rights, which draw on highly individualistic Western concepts, it employs concepts like altruism and cooperation.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives. Written by a global network of experts, it explores the topic against the background of a variety of legal traditions.Common law and civil law are typically presented as antagonistic players on a field claimed by diverse legal systems: the former being based on precedent set by judges in deciding cases before them; the latter being founded on a set of rules intended to govern the decisions of those applying them. Perceived in this manner, common law and civil law differ in terms of the (main) source(s) of law; who is to create them; who is (merely) to draw from them; and whether the law itself is pure each step of the way, or whether the law¿s purity may be tarnished when confronted with a set of contingent facts. These differences have deep roots in (legal) history ¿ roots that allow us to trace them back to distinct traditions.Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the divide thus depicted is as great as it may seem: international and supranational legal systems unconcerned by national peculiarities appear to level the playing field. A normative understanding of constitutions seems to grant ever-greater authority to High Court decisions based on thinly worded maxims in countries that adhere to the civil law tradition. The challenges contemporary regulation faces call for ever-more detailed statutes governing the decisions of judges in the common law tradition. These and similar observations demand a structural reassessment of the role of judges, the power of precedent, the limits of legislation and other features often thought to be so different in common and civil law systems. The book addresses this reassessment.

Yet the legal concept of evidence is constantly changing, and the debate concerning the distinction between a legal concept of evidence, the ordinary concept of evidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives. Perceived in this manner, common law and civil law differ in terms of the (main) source(s) of law;

The book focuses on Robert Alexy's theory of constitutional rights. The aim of this book is to outline the central aspects of Alexy's theory as he sees them, and to further develop the principles of constitutional, fundamental, and human rights by applying a constructive criticism of his theory.

This book represents a unique resource about Stewart Macaulay one of the common law world's leading scholars of the law of contract and of the law in action approach to the study of law.

This book represents a unique resource about Stewart Macaulay one of the common law world's leading scholars of the law of contract and of the law in action approach to the study of law.

The notion of sovereignty plays an important part in various areas of law, such as constitutional law and international public law.

The book defines and critically discusses the following five principles: the harm principle, legal paternalism, the offense principle, legal moralism and the dignity principle of criminalization.

This book puts forward a new theoretical concept of the juridical act, this concept is not described from the perspective of a specific national legal system, but instead represents the commonalities and ideas that stem from the Western legal tradition.

A theme of growing importance in both the law and philosophy and socio-legal literature is how regulatory dynamics can be identified (that is, conceptualised and operationalised) and normative expectations met in an age when transnational actors operate on a global plane and in increasingly fragmented and transformative contexts. A reconsideration of established theories and axiomatic findings on regulatory phenomena is an essential part of this discourse. There is indeed an urgent need for discontinuity regarding what we (think we) know about, among other things, law, legality, sovereignty and political legitimacy, power relations, institutional design and development, and pluralist dynamics of ordering under processes of globalisation and transnationalism.Making an important contribution to the scholarly debate on the subject, this volume features original and much-needed essays of theoretical and applied legal philosophy as well as socio-legal accounts that reflecton whether legal positivism has anything to offer to this intellectual enterprise. This is done by discussing whether global and transnational cultural, socio-political, economic, and juridical challenges as well as processes of diversification, fragmentation, and transformation (significantly, de-formalisation) reinforce or weaken legal positivists¿ assumptions, claims, and methods. The themes covered include, but are not limited to, absolute and limited state sovereignty; the ¿new international legal positivism¿; Hartian legal positivism and the ¿normative positivist¿ account; the relationship between modern secularisation, social conventionalism, and meta-ontological issues of temporality in postnational jurisprudence; the social positivisation of human rights; the formation and content of jus cogens norms; feminist critique; the global and transnational migration of principles of justice and morality; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rule of interpretation; and the responsibility of transnational corporations.

This book explores the interrelation of facts and norms. Today, Jellinek's concept still provides astonishing insights on the dichotomy of "is" and "ought to be", the emergence of the normative, the efficacy and the defeasibility of (legal) norms, and the distinct character of what legal theorists refer to as "normativity".

This work explains the nature of constitutional rights. It does so by means of an analysis of the nature of law in general, the nature of constitutions, and the nature of rights.

Instead of the usualapologetic treatment found in legal doctrine, linked to the determinacy,immutability or predictability of norms, this book treats legal certaintyinnovatively, holistically and in depth.

Based on Olivecrona's critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, the book argues that Olivecrona's legal philosophy is a unique contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy.

In this book the author investigates what is common to the German idea of the Rechtsstaat and the Anglo-American idea of the Rule of Law. In the book basic concepts such as legality, legal equality, legal certainty, legal accessibility and legal security are investigated.

This book proposes a new approach to the retributive theory of punishment, arguing that it should be understood in its traditional formulation that has been long forgotten or dismissed: that punishment is essentially a defense of the honor of the victim

Grounded in linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, this book's innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others.

Written from 40 years of research in civil law and the philosophy of law, this volume focuses on the interpretation and systematisation of legal norms. The text also includes an updated discussion on the writings of Robert Alexy, Jurgen Habermas, Ronald Dworkin, and Alf Ross.

This book highlights the active role of language in diplomatic negotiations and in interpreting international law by analyzing the decision-making process and the legal discourse adopted by the WTO's Appellate Body.

This book provides an exhaustive analysis and criticism of the main theories of the practice of law-applying officials. It proposes an elaborate model of collective action and the notion of being under a duty qua member of a group.