Bøger i Mouton Series in Pragmatics serien

All of the papers included in this volume offer some novel and/or updated perspective on issues of central importance in pragmatics, suggesting original ways in which research in the particular areas they adhere to could advance. Apart from the obvious aim of motivating further discussion on the topics it touches on, a central objective of this volume is to underline that research in pragmatics can and does substantially inform research in numerous other fields of enquiry, namely philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics and conversation analysis, revealing in this way the truly interdisciplinary nature of pragmatics theorizing. In this respect, and given that most of the contributions in this volume are from leading scholars in their respective fields, it is clearly expected that the ideas put forth in this volume will have a profound and long-lasting impact for future research in the area.

In legal interpretation, where does meaning come from? Law is made from language, yet law, unlike other language-related disciplines, has not so far experienced its "pragmatic turn" towards inference and the construction of meaning. This book investigates to what extent a pragmatically based view of l linguistic and legal interpretation can lead to new theoretical views for law and, in addition, to practical consequences in legal decision-making.With its traditional emphasis on ?the letter of the law? and the immutable stability of a text as legal foundation, law has been slow to take the pragmatic perspective: namely, the language-user?'s experience and activity in making meaning. More accustomed to literal than to pragmatic notions of meaning, that is, ?in? the text rather than constructed by speakers and hearers ? the disciplines of law may be culturally resistant to the pragmatic turn. By bringing together the different but complementary perspectives of pragmaticians and lawyers, this book addresses the issue of to what extent legal meaning can be productively analysed as deriving from resources beyond the text, ? beyond the letter of the law.This collection re-visits the feasibility of the notion of literal meaning for legal interpretation and, at the same time, the feasibility of pragmatic meaning for law. Can explications of pragmatic meaning support court actions in the same way concepts of literal meaning have traditionally supported statutory interpretations and court judgements? What are the consequences of a user-based view of language for the law, in both its practices of interpretation and its definition of itself as a field? Readers will find in this collection means of approaching such questions, and promising routes for inquiry into the genre- and field-specific characteristics of inference in law.In many respects, the problem of literal vs. pragmatic? meaning confined to the text vs. reaching beyond it ? will appear to parallel the dichotomy in law between textualism and intentionalism. There are indeed illuminating connections between the pair of linguistic terms and the more publicly controversial legal ones. But the parallel is not exact, and the linguistic dichotomy is in any case anterior to the legal one. Even as linguistic-pragmatic investigation may serve legal domains, the legal questions themselves point back to central conditions of all linguistic meaning.

Cognitive pragmatics is a mature field of research, characterized by robust theories and a growing amount of experimental work. In particular, Relevance Theory has provided a rich framework for research in the field. However, this theory makes a number of assumptions that are rooted in a modular view of cognition. This book provides a detailed analysis of such assumptions, arguing for an alternative model which has, however, some support in ideas explored by relevance theorists. First of all, inferences are explained in terms of associative pattern completion within associative networks, based on the schematic organization of memory. This explanation is shown to apply to a number of cognitive domains besides pragmatics, including mindreading. Moreover, such a view is compatible with a general understanding of the neurocomputational machinery of our cortex, suggesting a general argument to the effect that modularity in its standard version cannot be right. Second, the book argues for a crucial role of conscious attention in pragmatics as well as in most cognitive processes. In the end, what is proposed is not only a revision of Relevance Theory but also a fresh analysis of reasoning, which vindicates some Gricean intuitions.