Bøger i Philosophical Studies Series serien

According to those theologians, man's actions are determined but man retains the power to act otherwise and therefore is responsible for his actions. Savage challenges the dogma that Leibniz's metaphysical principles entail that individuals are powerless to act otherwise and that God cannot conceive of them acting otherwise.

When we ask whether something exists, we expect a yes or no answer, not a further query about what kind of existence, how much of it, whether we mean existence for you or existence for me, or whether we are asking about some property which it might have.

Moreover, it seems we have good reasons to believe that the content of our beliefs and desires derives its normative import qua normative import from the objects of our beliefs and desires.

This volume offers an appreciation of Ernest Sosa's wide philosophical purview, a nuanced assessment of the detail of his thought, and a spur to examine the linkages between the varied topics explored by the subtle mind of this great American scholar.

It considers the history and philosophical merits of psychologism, and looks systematically at psychologism in phenomenology, cognitive science, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophical semantics, and artificial intelligence.

This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports.

This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from both a make-believe theoretical element and a set-theoretical element.

Our world is full of composite objects that persist through time: dogs, persons, chairs and rocks. But in virtue of what do a bunch of little objects get to compose some bigger object, and how does that bigger object persist through time?

The final chapters explore in detail the implications of Moore's theory for individual moral conduct -- in particular, his denial of self-evident moral rules; and his account of what moral agents should do in situations where such rules apply and in situations where they do not.

Emotion in Aesthetics is the first book on aesthetics to provide an extensive theory of emotion; a well-developed naturalistic theory of ethics as applied to aesthetics and emotion. As a result there is still much confusion in aesthetics about aesthetic emotion and related concepts, such as the expression theory of emotion.

One of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly `understanding' a referring act in communication.

In Cooperation, A Philosophical Study, Tuomela offers the first comprehensive philosophical theory of cooperation. It also shows some of the drawbacks of the standard game-theoretical treatments of cooperation and presents a survey of cooperation research in neighbouring fields.

Blending academic authority with creative flair and demonstrating the continuing interest of ancient Greek philosophy, this book will be a valuable addition to the libraries of all those studying and researching the origins of Western philosophy.

Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories of scientific psychology, represent attempts to capture the essence of emotions basically as they are conceived in common sense psychology. It is incumbent on a theory of emotions to provide an account of two salient facts about emotions as conceived in common sense psychology.

The author develops an account of what moral principles are sound, how we can apply them to complex situations, and what makes it reasonable to treat individuals in accordance with particular moral principles. Most such authors state some general principles, but say little about why these principles should be accepted.

Are we morally required to act in the interests of others? A distinguishing feature of the book is its unusually comprehensive treatment of the moral significance of other-interested considerations per se, of how these considerations are interrelated, and of where they should be located in more general moral theory.

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions;

With one exception, all of the papers in this volume were originally presented at a conference held in April, 1978, at The Ohio State University. The excep tion is the paper by Wilfrid Sellars, which is a revised version of a paper he originally published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1973.

This essay is the product of years of distaste for, and dissatisfaction with, the efforts of moral philosophers. Generally speaking, philosophy, and, in particular, moral philosophy, is too hard fot philosophers.

Papers presented at the First Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974

Papers deriving from and related to a Workshop on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars held at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1976

" Such truths are to be discovered inductively by comparing and analyzing concrete cases of the admittedly proper u/le .

When I was Dickinson Miller's assistant from 1940 to 1942, I soon realized that I had encountered an unusually powerful, acute, and original mind and a writer whose clear but vivid style matched the high quality of his intelligence.

This volume contains outstanding studies by some of the best scholars in ancient Greek Philosophy on key topics in Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian thought.

Proceedings of the First International Colloquim on Cognitive Science

The conception of a right that Berger defends derives from J ohn Stuart Mill and is captured by what he calls "the rights formula": to have a right is to have important interests that society ought to protect as a matter of general rule (pp.