Bøger i Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions serien

This book argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, if they are insulated from unstable democratic politics. The book will appeal to those interested in political science, economics, law, sociology, and modern political history.

This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization, the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise.

A rational choice model analyses the problems of voter choice, the emergence of partly loyalty and cabinet government in Victorian England.

The book explains how different political and economic circumstances account for the variation in the economic vote. Based on the analysis of 165 public opinion surveys from 19 countries, the authors demonstrate that their explanations are empirically sound.

How did Poland go from an authoritarian one-party state with a faltering centrally planned economy to become a relatively stable multiparty democracy and a market economy? This book explains these successes by the high rate of creation and growth of new, domestically owned firms between 1990 and 1997.

This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes.

This analysis builds on earlier theoretical work by Mancur Olson, William Riker and Douglass North. Professor Schofield emphasizes that under some conditions architects of political change can put a new perspective on societal quandaries, such that societies can choose an option that has a better 'probability of a fit choice'.

This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The model uses the idea of valence, that is the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity.

There is surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. The essays in this volume show, through case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, how presidential democracies deal with the challenges of economic reform.

This 1993 study uses the experience of Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey to lay bare the dynamics of public sector growth, crisis and reform.

The book assesses the impact of political and social institutions on regulatory structures in the telecommunications industry in five countries.

This book examines how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation.

This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide.

Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets.

This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical model of how parties create and then maintain or replace new governments. The theory involves strategic interaction and its consequences, then tests empirical hypotheses with data drawn from postwar European parliamentary democracies.

This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority in constitutional courts, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The book provides an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews.

There is surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. The essays in this volume show, through case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, how presidential democracies deal with the challenges of economic reform.

This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Diaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.

This collection of empirical studies analyses historical and contemporary institutions and institutional change in various parts of the world.

Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets.

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. State legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in our nation's history.

This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him.

This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

An introduction to the new field of positive political economy and the various economic and political processes with which it is concerned.

Most citizens seem under-informed about politics. Many experts claim that only well-informed citizens can make good political decisions. Is this claim correct? In The Democratic Dilemma, Professors Lupia and McCubbins combine insights from political science, economics and the cognitive sciences to explain how citizens gather and use information.

Managerial Dilemmas extends the use of analytical techniques from organisational economics to the spheres of organisational culture and leadership in politics and business.

This 2001 book explains why African countries have remained mired in a disastrous economic crisis since the late 1970s. It shows that dynamics internal to African state structures largely explain this failure to overcome economic difficulties rather than external pressures on these same structures as is often argued. Far from being prevented from undertaking reforms by societal interest and pressure groups, clientelism within the state elite, ideological factors and low state capacity have resulted in some limited reform, but much prevarication and manipulation of the reform process, by governments which do not really believe that reform will be effective, which often oppose reforms because they would undercut the patronage and rent-seeking practices which undergird political authority, and which lack the administrative and technical capacity to implement much reform. Over time, state decay has increased.

This 2000 book addresses the discrepancy between the developing economy of England between 1720-1844, and the stagnant legal framework of business organization during the same period. The book focuses on the ways by which the legal-economic nexus of the period gave rise to the modern institutions of organizing business.

Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.