Bøger i Studies in Choice and Welfare serien

The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making.

This book presents research on recent developments in collective decision-making. With contributions from leading scholars from a variety of disciplines, it provides an up-to-date overview of applications in social choice theory, welfare economics, and industrial organization. The contributions address, amongst others, topics such as measuring power, the manipulability of collective decisions, and experimental approaches. Applications range from analysis of the complicated institutional rules of the European Union to responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages or the design of webpage rankings. With its interdisciplinary focus, the book seeks to bridge the gap between different disciplinary approaches by pointing to open questions that can only be resolved through collaborative efforts.

This book provides a comprehensive mathematical description and analysis of the delegate allocation processes in the US Democratic and Republican presidential primaries, focusing on the role of apportionment methods and the effect of thresholds¿the minimum levels of support required to receive delegates. The analysis involves a variety of techniques, including theoretical arguments, simplicial geometry, Monte Carlo simulation, and examination of presidential primary data from 2004 to 2020. The book is divided into two parts: Part I defines the classical apportionment problem and explains how the implementation and goals of delegate apportionment differ from those of apportionment for state representation in the US House of Representatives and for party representation in legislatures based on proportional representation. The authors then describe how delegates are assigned to states and congressional districts and formally define the delegate apportionment methods usedin each state by the two major parties to allocate delegates to presidential candidates. Part II analyzes and compares the apportionment methods introduced in Part I based on their level of bias and adherence to various notions of proportionality. It explores how often the methods satisfy the quota condition and quantifies their biases in favor or against the strongest and weakest candidates. Because the methods are quota-based, they are susceptible to classical paradoxes like the Alabama and population paradoxes. They also suffer from other paradoxes that are more relevant in the context of delegate apportionment such as the elimination and aggregation paradoxes. The book evaluates the extent to which each method is susceptible to each paradox. Finally, it discusses the appointment of delegates based on divisor methods and notions of regressive proportionality.This book appeals to scholars and students interested in mathematical economics and political science, with an emphasis on apportionment and social choice theory.

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms.

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms.

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist.

This collection of essays honouring Dan Felsenthal and Moshe Machover reconsiders foundational aspects of the measurement of voting power. The specific case of voting power in two-tier systems - for instance the US system and the EU system - is analysed. Furthermore major power indices - Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and others are revisited.

The papers in this volume explore various issues relating to theories of individual and collective choice, and theories of social welfare. The topics include individual and collective rationality, motivation and intention in economics, coercion, public goods, climate change, and voting theory.

This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs.

This collection of essays honouring Dan Felsenthal and Moshe Machover reconsiders foundational aspects of the measurement of voting power. The specific case of voting power in two-tier systems - for instance the US system and the EU system - is analysed. Furthermore major power indices - Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and others are revisited.

Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers.

This collection of thirteen essays on social ethics and normative economics honouring Serge-Christophe Kolm's seminal contributions to this field addresses the following questions: How should the public sector price its production and services?

This book advances the concept of representativeness, and shows how it can be applied in a mathematical evaluation of either individual representatives such as a president, or representative bodies such as parliaments or councils of ministers.

Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers.

This collection of thirteen essays on social ethics and normative economics honouring Serge-Christophe Kolm's seminal contributions to this field addresses the following questions: How should the public sector price its production and services?

Essays in Honor of Kotaro Suzumura

Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems.

With approval voting, voters can approve of as many candidates as they want, and the one approved by the most voters wins. This book surveys a wide variety of empirical and theoretical knowledge accumulated from years of studying this method of voting.

Strategic Social Choice provides the first monograph devoted to the modeling of constitutions with effectivity functions. Written for researchers and students in the field, this volume focuses on social choice functions that admit strong Nash equilibrium.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems.

With approval voting, voters can approve of as many candidates as they want, and the one approved by the most voters wins. This book surveys a wide variety of empirical and theoretical knowledge accumulated from years of studying this method of voting.

This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. It also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner.

Kuklys examines how Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen's approach to welfare measurement can be put in practice for poverty and inequality measurement in affluent societies such as the UK.

Essays in Honor of Kotaro Suzumura

The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making.

The papers in this volume explore various issues relating to theories of individual and collective choice, and theories of social welfare. The topics include individual and collective rationality, motivation and intention in economics, coercion, public goods, climate change, and voting theory.

Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph.

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy.