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This book is a unique combination of intellectual history, personal memoir, and military theory. When Conrad Crane retired from twenty six years of active duty to become a research professor at the Army War College, he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to power without being heeded. As he watched the world change after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, he warned the Army that it was not prepared for Phase IV stability operations, counterinsurgency, and eventually the reconstruction of Iraq. Eventually his work attracted the attention of Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who along with his Marine counterpart James Mattis, was launching a broad program to make the American military a learning organization better prepared for modern war. Crane soon found himself in charge of a team of Soldiers, Marines, and civilian academics with the mission to create the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. For the next year he wrestled with conflicting ideas, complex personalities, and bureaucratic inertia to create the groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The process was long and tortuous, and much more complicated than the way it has been characterized so far in other narratives. The end result was a unique blend of traditional and modern theory, tempered by hard lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Its principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, focus on legitimacy, and concepts of operational campaign design have had immense influence on US and NATO doctrine. The new doctrine was not perfect, and had been rushed through production in record time, but the guidance it provided would be an essential element in the Surge in Iraq that secured breathing space for the nascent Iraqi government to solve its political differences. Crane found that out when General Petraeus asked him to come observe the Surge himself in late 2007. Traveling all around that embattled nation, Crane watched the greatest counterinsurgency force the world had ever seen adapting to the exigencies of modern counterinsurgency is a very complex environment. He describes in great detail the hard work of dedicated Soldiers, Marines, and civilians that were creating a mosaic peace out of a mosaic war, in places as disparate as Baghdad, Anbar Province, and the detention facilities at Bucca. There were still problem areas, such as in the British zone and Diyala Province, but the conflict was definitely trending in the right direction. Crane closes his book with an account of what went wrong in Iraq, as the mosaic peace unraveled with the Americandeparture, and also how the new counterinsurgency doctrine was never properly resourced or applied in Afghanistan. His final chapter covers the lessons be believes should be gleaned from the past decade and a half of global war. There have been many critics of the new doctrine, and Crane recounts their arguments and concedes that promises of counterinsurgency were oversold. But much of what has been labeled as counterinsurgency is really just modern warfare, and while the United States is understandably reluctant to engage in further irregular conflicts and nation building, they remain a growth industry in the rest of the world. The United States government, military and civilian agencies, must be prepared to do better next time. And Cassandra says, there will be a next time.

For more than half of its existence, members of the Marine Corps largely self-identified as soldiers, and it did not yet mean something distinct to be a Marine. This work argues that the Marine Corps could not and would not settle on a mission, and therefore it turned to an image to ensure its institutional survival.

The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organisations better at this contest than others.

Documents the rapid development of nuclear ballistic missiles in the United States and their equally swift demise after the Cuban Missile Crisis, revealing how these drastic changes negatively influenced both the Air Force and the missile community.

Tells the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. It is more than a simple history; it describes how an organisation dominated by World War II experienced airmen developed a unique culture.

Provides a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc). Although written from a US perspective, its contents are globally relevant.

The Other Space Race is a unique look at the early U.S. space program and how it both shaped and was shaped by politics during the Cold War. Eisenhowers New Look expanded the role of the Air Force in national security, and ultimately allowed ambitious aerospace projects, namely the Dyna-Soar, a bomber equipped with nuclear weapons that would operate in space. Eisenhowers space policy was purely practical, creating a strong deterrent against the use of nuclear arms against the United States.With the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, the political climate changed, and space travel became part of the United States national discourse. Sambaluk explores what followed, including the scuttling of the Dyna-Soar program and the transition from Eisenhowers space policy to John Kennedys. This well-argued, well-researched book gives much needed perspective on the Cold Wars influence on space travel and its relation to the formation of public policy.

As Clausewitz observed, "In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect." The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice.Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: The Study of Strategy from Archidamus to Airpower, argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment, and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking.With that thought in mind, the authors of Strategy offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Each contributing chapter author is a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies in Montgomery, AL, widely considered the DoDs premier school of strategy. Each earned a PhD in either history or political science. All contributors are prolific and widely respected in their fields. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than anyone else, must think strategically about the application of power on land, at sea, and in the air, space and cyberspace. In addition to the exploration of various sub-disciplines regarding strategys role in the employment of power, and perhaps more importantly, Strategy illuminates different approaches to thinking about strategy, which have implications beyond the profession of arms. Therefore, the authors examine the learning and teaching of strategic concepts. The book does not provide a blueprint for how to teach or learn strategy (in fact, the authors contend that such a blueprint would be short-sighted and perhaps even dangerous). On the contrary, the work explores how one should think about the study of strategy through an appreciation of both context and uncertainty.Thus, the book not only contributes to a greater understanding of the strategic aspects of the employment of power, but also widens the aperture in recognizing different ways to explore new concepts. The authors contend that only through a willingness to explore different approaches do budding strategists make the most of their journey.

It isconvenientto think that bad guys are drumming up money for their activities far away and in shady back alleys, but the violent non-state actors (VNSAs) of the world arehiding in plain sight. They peddleknockoff sneakers, pass the hat at ethnic festivals, takea cut of untaxed booze sales,swindlesenior citizens with bogus phone calls about needing bail in Mexico,and run money through mainstream banksto buyup rental properties (just to name a few). On a grand scale, their behavior erodes rule of law, creates moral injuries from corruption,and emboldens bad actors to steal and back violent tactics with impunity.Blood Money analyzesthe ways in which VNSAs find money for their operations and sustainment, from controlling a valuable commodity to harnessing the grievances of a networked diaspora, andit looks atthe channels through which they can flip the positives of globalization into flat, fast, andfrictionlessmovement of people, funds,and materials needed to terrorize and coerce their opponents.AuthorMargaret Sankey highlightsthe mundane and everyday nature of these tactics, occurring under our noses online, in legitimate marketplaces,and with the aegis of intelligence services and national governments. While reforms attempt to curtail these options, their utility andefficacyas tools of financehave provedinadequateforsovereignstates.VNSAsdefiance of rulesand their capable adaptation and innovationmake them extremely difficult to pin down or prosecute. Manysecurity publications stress legislation and enforcement or frame illicit finance as a military or police problem. WithBlood Money,Sankey pointsoutthemanyways VNSAs evade lawenforcement,andsheoffers options for involving consumers and activists in exercising agency and choicesin how they apply their money and where it goes.Blood Moneyalsoprovidescontext for whole-of-government approaches to attacking underlying supports for illicit financing channels.How these groups finance themselves is key to understanding how they function and what actions might be taken toderail their plans or dismantle their structure.

From Yeomanettes to Fighter Jets addresses a major element of twenty-first century sea power--the integration of women into all military units of the U.S. Navy. Randy Goguen delineates the cultural, economic, and political conditions as well as the technological changes that shaped this movement over the course of a century. Starting with the establishment of the Yeomen (F) in World War I and continuing through today to address the current arguments over the registration of women for Selective Service and the reform of the military justice system, Goguen describes how changes in civilian society affected the U. S. Navy and the role of Navy women. She highlights the contributions of key women and men in the military and civilian spheres who were willing to challenge convention and prejudice to advance the integration of women and make the U.S. Navy a stronger institution.  Today women in the U.S. Navy have proven themselves essential to the mission success of the service. They are forward deployed around the world, sharing the same risks as their male counterparts. Some have commanded logistics and combatant ships, including aircraft carriers. They fly and maintain combat and patrol aircraft and serve as crew members on ships and submarines. Some hold major commands ashore and have risen to the highest echelons of navy leadership.    Integrating women into the U.S. Navy has been a long and often contentious process, as women strived to overcome resistance imposed by prevailing cultural and institutional norms and patriarchal prejudices. Goguen, a retired naval reserve officer who holds a PhD in military history from Temple University, has written a comprehensive and up-to-date history of women's integration into the Navy. She argues that throughout the process, the decisive force driving progress was exigency. That exigency took various forms: two world wars, communist expansionism in the Cold War, the ending of the draft and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, as well as the political pressures posed by social change, especially the mid twentieth-century feminist and contemporary "Me Too" movements. Despite a deeply ingrained institutional resistance cultivated within an insular, often misogynist, sea-going subculture, today's U.S. Navy could not meet its mission requirements without women. Goguen asserts, "Exigency is the mother of integration."

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense's premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.