Bøger i Trends in Southeast Asia (TRS) serien

Amidst rising trends of nativism and xenophobia throughout Southeast Asia, a related yet distinct movement framed around altogether different notions of Indigeneity is occurring among various long-oppressed ethnic minorities. These groups are all arising in response to the heightened incorporation of their communities and territories into expanding nation states.

Examines Chinese investment in Cambodia. Cambodia's economic over dependence and power asymmetry have enabled China to exert political leverage over the Kingdom, especially on international issues affecting Chinas core national interest such as the South China Sea dispute. Local communities are discontented with some Chinese investment projects, especially hydropower plants and land concessions.

Malaysia will hold its 14th general election before August 2018, bringing renewed focus on the nature of political competition in the country. This paper provides a systematic overview of the electoral process and an assessment of how it shapes the country's political environment.

The power of the Thai military is exerted not only through its use of force but also by means of its socio-political arms. The Internal Security Operations Command represents a potent tool with which conservative elites can undermine and control electoral democracy and through which the military can maintain its power.

Examines how the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs has been managed under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from 2014 to the present. The book highlights similarities and differences in Jokowi's control of the influential ministry compared to his predecessors.

Challenges facing Vietnam's export of fruits and vegetables to the Chinese market include technical barriers, long risk assessment periods, restrictions on products exported through official quotas to the Chinese market, and frequent changes in China's policy on border crossings.

The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996 was due to the Malaysian government's initiative to tap into the ICT sector. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the knowledge economy, digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly over information flows.

Although Pakatan Harapan (PH) in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year's political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH's ability to maintain its strong margin.

Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community.

In late February 2020, the Mahathir Mohamad-led Pakatan Harapan (Harapan, or Pact of Hope) government ended abruptly. Amidst ensuing confusion, Muhyiddin Yassin led defecting Harapan Members of Parliament, joined by UMNO and PAS, in an ad hoc Perikatan Nasional (PN, or National Alliance) coalition to form a ""backdoor government"".

Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1993-98, and Opposition Leader, 2008-15 and since March 2020, is associated with two lasting, seemingly contradictory images. The young Anwar as a radical Islamist for whom economics seemed not to matter, and as a pro-market reformer during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis.

Studies on Chinese influence in Southeast Asia predominantly focus on the Chinese state. This paper argues that Chinese non-state actors and their daily encounters with local communities in Southeast Asia deserve equal attention as these interactions evidently produce friction at both the society-to-state and state-to-state levels.

Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism. Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system--regime change not excluded--to deal with Chinese threats. An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends. Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims. The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

Gen Z's protests have accomplished what has been elusive to prior generations of anti-regime movements and uprisings. They have severed the Bamar Buddhist nationalist narrative that has gripped state society relations and the military's ideological control over the political landscape, substituting for it an inclusive democratic ideology.