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This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail.
Strategic Social Choice provides the first monograph devoted to the modeling of constitutions with effectivity functions. Written for researchers and students in the field, this volume focuses on social choice functions that admit strong Nash equilibrium.
This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters.
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