Bøger af David Lai

Most of the ideas that form of the foundation of American defense policy and military strategy today were once new and untested concepts at the far edge of strategic thought. It took thinkers of vision and creativity to give them life and refine them to the point they could be adopted by the defense community and used for strategy and force development. This is a never ending process: new strategic concepts constantly emerge, some fade away, a few pass the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability and make it into the mainstream. To help with this process of identifying those new and untested strategic concepts that merit further examination, the Strategic Studies Institute is publishing a special series called "Advancing Strategic Thought." This provides a venue--a safe haven--for creative, innovative, and experimental thinking about national security policy and military strategy. The study by David Lai is the inaugural publication in the Advancing Strategic Thought Series. In it, Dr. Lai uses the ancient game of Go as a metaphor for the Chinese approach to strategy. He shows that this is very different than the linear method that underlies American strategy. By better understanding Go, Lai argues, American strategists could better understand Chinese strategy. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to officer this unique and creative analysis as part of the Advancing Strategic Thought Series.

The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China's security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA's advances. This volume (and many of the previous volumes from past PLA conferences) show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise.

The most profound change that the United States and China have experienced in their relations over the past 30 years is perhaps the onset of an apparent power transition between the two nations. This potentially titanic change was set in motion as a result of China's genuine and phenomenal economic development, and the impact of this economic success on the United States and the U.S.-led international system has been growing steadily. This perceived power transition process will continue to be a defining factor in U.S.-China relations for the next 30 years. As China's economic, political, cultural, and military influence continue to grow globally, what kind of a global power will China become? What kind of a relationship will evolve between China and the United States? How will the United States maintain its leadership in world affairs and develop a working relationship with China so that China can join hands with the United States to shape the world in constructive ways? In this book, Dr. David Lai offers an engaging discussion of these questions and others. His analysis addresses issues that trouble U.S. as well as Chinese leaders. Dr. Lai has taken painstaking care to put the conflicting positions in perspective, most notably presenting the origins of the conflicts, highlighting the conflicting parties' key opposing positions (by citing their primary or original sources), and pointing out the stalemates.

The annual Conference on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) took place at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on October 22-24, 2010.1 The topic for this year's conference was the "PLA's lessons from Other People's Wars." Participants at the conference sought to discern what lessons the PLA has been learning from the strategic and operational experiences of the armed forces of other countries during the past 3 decades. Why did observers of the PLA want to study what Chinese military analysts might learned about non-Chinese wars? The answer is twofold. First, the PLA has not fought an actual war since 1979. Yet, during the last 3 decades, fundamental changes have taken place on the battlefield and in the conduct of war. Since the PLA has not fought since 1979, it had no experience in the changing face of war, and thus could not follow Mao Zedong's admonition to "learn by doing"; instead, it must look abroad for ways to discern the new pattern of warfare in the evolving information age. Studying Chinese military analysts' observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides us a glimpse of what the PLA takes from others' experience to improve its capability and to prepare itself for dealing with China's national security issues, such as Taiwan, the South and East China Sea disputes, and internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, to name the most obvious ones. Second, Chinese military analysts have noticeably more freedom in assessing and commenting on the strength and weakness as well as the success and fail¬ures of other countries' wars. Indeed, for political reasons, Chinese military analysts have to emphasize the heroics and triumphs of the PLA's war experience and downplay setbacks and failures.2 While there is certainly recognition of the daunting challenges-in Korea, for example, accounts readily acknowledge that the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) were totally unprepared logistically and devastated by airpower-there are limits to the levels of candor. To date, there is no critical analysis of the PLA's claimed success or dismissed failure in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979 by Chinese military analysts (however, there are a few studies done by scholars outside of China3). Studying Chinese military analysts' observation of other people's wars, therefore, provide us key hints as to what Chinese military analysts consider important aspects of current and future military operational success and failure.

This analysis discusses the nature of U.S.-China relations in the context of an ongoing power transition between these two great powers, the rise of China and its impact, China's tortuous experience during its transition to modernity, U.S.-China conflicts over the two nations' core interests, and the future of the U.S.-China power transition. This analysis holds the following propositions. First, as a result of its genuine development and the impact of its expanding influence on the international system, China and the United States are inescapably engaged in a power transition process, which is, on top of all other issues, about the future of international relations. Second, the history of power transition is filled with bloodshed; yet China and the United States are willing to blaze a new path out of this deadly contest. Third, although China and the United States have exchanged goodwill for a peaceful future, the two nations nevertheless have many contentious and unsettled conflicts of interest that are further complicated by the power transition process and, if not properly managed, can force the two to stumble into unintended war against each other, hence repeating the history of power transition tragedy. Finally, the next 30 years will be a crucial stage for China's development and the evolution of the U.S.-China power transition. Unfortunately, these titanic changes are overshadowed by the inherently conflicting relations between China and the United States. It will take these two great powers extraordinary efforts to come to terms with the emerging new realities. Strategic Studies Institute.

This book is the product of a U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Integrated Research Project (IRP). It addresses a Chief of Staff, Army priority research topic and was sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (HQDA G-35). The book resulted from a whole-of-War College effort. Core curriculum and regional elective studies augmented student research and facilitated analysis. Faculty from across the USAWC supported analytical discussions, mentored student participants, and reviewed the written contributions. Students and faculty met with Asia-Pacific policy experts in the U.S. Government from the Department of State, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the National Security Council. Researchers also traveled to the Asia-Pacific to meet with senior military leaders and security analysts in Japan and China, as well as the major U.S. military commands in Hawaii, to explore issues and develop recommendations on regional issues.