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The working dog conditioning and training manual developed by the U.S. military--from simple commands to border security to complex actions, such as those performed by the dog Cairo in the raid that killed Osama Bin laden.

This report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed by legislation. This is the twentieth report in this series of quarterly reports. The most recent report was submitted in May 2010. As a consequence of the movement of U.S. combat forces out of Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009, the United States has reduced visibility and ability to verify Iraqi reports. Without a robust U.S. presence, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) metrics include host nation reports that are not independently verifiable. The overall trends between U.S. force data and host nation data are very close, but some values may differ. Current charts show a combination of U.S. and host-nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to compare these charts with those from previous publications of this report. Each slide is annotated to indicate the types of reports included. Political, rule of law, economic and energy, and security trends in Iraq continued to improve this period, but progress was limited as the Iraqis remain focused on forming the government following a successful election. The ISF have executed their security responsibilities extremely well, maintaining historically low levels of security incidents. All operations are conducted by, with, and through the ISF, while U.S. Forces continue to advise, train, assist, and equip the ISF to improve their capabilities and capacity. Meanwhile, USF-I is on track to complete the transition to stability operations by September 1, 2010. The ongoing implementation of the SFA this reporting period sets the stage for long-term cooperative efforts as Iraq develops into a sovereign, stable, self-reliant partner in the region and as the United States transitions roles and responsibilities from U.S. Forces to the GoI, the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, and other non-USF-I entities. The tentative resumption of foreign investment is an indicator that the continued reductions in overall violence have provided Iraqis an environment where political and economic development can occur. In spite of progress this period, challenges remain. Violent extremist networks, while significantly degraded, are still able to execute attacks. Tensions will remain high until the government is seated. Iraq remains fragile, primarily because many underlying sources of political instability have yet to be resolved. Once the new government is formed, it will need to continue to build legitimacy through the provision of basic services and improved security for the Iraqi people, the formulation of a solid plan for long-term economic growth and employment, and the creation of enduring solutions to lingering political, ethnic, and sectarian disputes.

According to the Army's Warrior Transition Command (WTC), there are approximately 10,000 Warriors in Transition in the Army WTUs. Close to 1,000 were wounded in combat, approximately 2,100 were injured or became sick and were treated while deployed in Southwest Asia, approximately 2,000 recently returned from a deployment prior to entry into a WTU but were not treated during the deployment, and approximately 4,900 had never been deployed. The broad objective of this ongoing assessment is to determine whether the DoD programs for the care, management, and transition of recovering Service members wounded during deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom were managed effectively and efficiently. Our specific objectives were to evaluate the missions, the policies, and processes of: Military units, beginning with the Army and Marine Corps, established to support the recovery of Service members and their transition to duty status (Active or Reserve Components) or to civilian life; and DoD programs for Service members affected with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is the second of multiple assessments that will be conducted at Army and Marine Corps Warrior transition units. To obtain unbiased data, not unduly reflecting the views of either the supporters or detractors of the program, we used a two-pronged approach to select our respondents. First, we determined how many Service members were required to be interviewed, then we applied a simple random sample approach to determine the Service members we should interview, as described in Appendix A. We subsequently performed interviews with Army wounded, ill, and injured personnel, to include 96 individual interviews with Soldiers and 26 additional Soldiers in 5 group interviews. Second, we interviewed all available members of the key groups at each site responsible for the Warriors' care. Specifically, we conducted meetings and interviews during our 2-week visit at Fort Drum that included unit commanders, staff officers, and Warrior Transition Battalion (WTB) military staff, as well as civilian staff and contractors. A list of the meetings conducted at the Fort Drum Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC)3and the 3rd Battalion, 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment, which is the Fort Drum WTB, is shown in Appendix A, along with the scope, methodology, and acronyms of this assessment. The prior coverage of this subject area is discussed in Appendix B. The observations and corresponding recommendations in this report focus on what we learned at Fort Drum. In addition, noteworthy practices that may have application at other Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are also described. Additional reports and/or assessments may be subsequently performed by the DoD Office of the Inspector General on DoD Wounded Warrior matters or other related issues as they are identified. Any specific issues, concerns, and challenges that we identified at Fort Drum that may have to be addressed in future assessments and/or reports are discussed in Appendix C.

Beginning in April 2008, the Secretary of Defense and the Inspector General, Department of Defense (DOD IG) received letters from numerous members of Congress requesting inquiries into the issues raised in an April 20, 2008, New York Times article, "Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand." Members of Congress also requested concurrent inquiries from the Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Federal Communications Commission for (1) a legal opinion on whether DOD violated laws related to propaganda, and (2) an opinion on whether the military analysts received valuable consideration and did not disclose the origin or source of the information broadcast, respectively. Congress included the requirements for GAO and DOD IG inquiries in Public Law 110-417, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, October 14, 2008. In response to congressional requests and Public Law, we conducted a review and issued DOD IG Report IE-2009-004, "Examination of Allegations Involving DOD Office of Public Affairs Outreach Program," dated January 14, 2009. However, following subsequent questions and an internal quality review, the DOD IG withdrew the report. To address the congressional concerns, we initiated this reevaluation in August 2009 focusing on the following questions: Did the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD (PA)) outreach activities for Retired Military Analysts (RMA) comply with policies, procedures and requirements? Were the activities reviewed, approved and executed in accordance with the guidelines? Did RMAs have access to high-level officials, travel events, and classified information not available to others? If so, did the access comply with legal and policy requirements? Did RMAs have Defense contractor affiliations? If so, did participation in the RMA outreach activities benefit them financially as it relates to the contractor affiliation? In its legal opinion (B-316443, July 21, 2009)1, GAO concluded "these [RMA Outreach] activities did not violate the publicity or propaganda prohibition." Accordingly, our reevaluation did not address whether OASD (PA) used RMAs as surrogates to deliver propaganda messages to the American public.

This report describes the results of the 2007 Department of Defense (DoD) biennial safety perception survey for the DoD Reserve Component population group. Since 2003, the Secretary of defense has issued several memoranda directing senior leaders to reduce preventable accidents. On May 20 2007, the Secretary of defense established the goal of "zero preventable accidents." This survey is one of many DoD Inspector General (IG) efforts to assist the DoD community at-large to prevent accidents and improve the Department's safety program. The offices of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and Services should review these results to measure safety climate and cultural changes, identify trends, and target safety prevention opportunities.

This report is the third in a series of DoD Office of Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations assessments regarding accountability and control of sensitive items transferred or being transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). We performed the first assessment on accountability and control of munitions being transferred to the ISF in September and October 2007. The team returned to Iraq in April - May 2008 for a second assessment, this time to determine the status of the corrective actions undertaken based on the first report, and to review the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the development of Iraqi logistics and medical sustainability. During the fieldwork, we discovered potentially significant weaknesses in the management of internal controls for NVDs by the U.S. military, and alerted the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), to those problems. We conducted he fieldwork for this third assessment in Iraq during October and November 2008. The team assessed the oversight and management of NVDs, and whether current accountability, control, and physical security concerning the distribution of NVDs provided to the ISF was adequate. In the course of our assessment, we reviewed the following areas: contracting and procurement, transportation and storage, U.S. issuance procedures, and the accountability and control support provided by the ISF.

Security spans the Department of Defense and is essential to protecting its resources. For this reason, the DoD has long sought to create a corps of well trained, competent security personnel to support protection efforts. Properly applied, a capable security structure can be effective in the possible deterrence of another Fort Hood or WikiLeaks incident. Several security reviews and audits have assessed the state of security training and certification, both within the Federal Government and specific to the DoD, and have made recommendations to further enhance the professionalization and proficiencies of the security workforce. The process for training and certifying DoD security professionals remains fragmentary with no standardization across the security enterprise. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) directed the Defense Security Service (DSS) to establish a training and certification program for security professionals with a goal towards security professionalization. DSS is in the process of fielding the SPeD Certification Program, which will provide a path towards security professionalization through a four level certification program. SPeD is a DoD-wide security training and certification program that will identify security proficiencies and accountabilities. When fully implemented, SPeD will provide the DoD security workforce a path towards professionalization and will establish standardized competencies across Services and commands. However, the program is in its preliminary stages and the path toward full implementation has not been completed. This is the second in a series of reports on security within the DoD requested by the USD(I) to assess the state of security in the Department. The overall assessment objective is to determine: how the Department programs and tracks its security costs and measures the return on investment for security expenditures; how security professionals are trained, certified, and professionalized; how security professionals' jobs are classified and graded; and how effective security policy is in addressing the security needs of the Department. The focus in this report is on security training, certification, and professionalization issues.

This Regulation is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 4650.1, "Policy for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum," June 8, 2004 (reference (a)). It implements the policy, delineates the process, identifies responsibilities, specifies the requirements, and promulgates procedures for the certification testing of the electromagnetic capability (EMC) features of Link 16 Terminals. The Regulation applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organization entities of the Department of Defense.

This Manual reissues DoD 5110.4-M (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoD Directives 5105.53 and 51104 (References (b) and (c)) to provide guidance for managing the correspondence of the Secretary of Defense (SedDef), Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), and Executive Secretary (ExecSec) of the Department of Defense as well as OSD and OD Component correspondence. This Volume describes the administrative processes of OSD and DoD correspondence, to include providing procedure for preparing and submitting SecDef, DepSecDef, and ExecSec correspondence; incorporates and cancels DoD Instruction 5330.2 (Reference (d)); established the Director, Executive Services Directorate (ESD), Washington Headquarters Service (WHS), as the lead agent for processing, controlling, disseminating, and archiving official classified and unclassified correspondence addressed to and sent by the SecDef, DepSecDef and the ExecSec and describes administrative processes and identifies responsibilities; provides general grammar, punctuation, and editing guidelines; and provides guidance on security classification in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, DoD 5200.1-PH, National Archives and Records and Records Administrative publication, and Executive Order 13526 (References (e) through (h), respectively).

This DoD regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD intelligence components that affect United States persons. It implements DoD Directive 5240.1, and replaces the November 30, 1979 version of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R. It is applicable to all DoD intelligence components. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," stipulates that certain activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons be governed by procedures issued by the agency head and approved by the Attorney General.

Our overall objective was to perform a quality review, using ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management System assessment techniques, of Defense Acquisition University (DAU) processes. We reviewed the processes within seven functional areas: Finance, Contracting, Micro-Purchases and Training Requisitions, Property Management, Real Property Management and Facilities Maintenance, Supply Management, and Information Systems (IS). We determined whether established practices and processes in each functional area were effectively implemented and maintained and whether process controls were adequate and identified organizational risks. We also determined the effectiveness of each process to identify areas needing improvement. The DAU President requested that the DoD Deputy Inspector General (IG) of Policy and Oversight conduct an ISO 9001:2008 quality assessment of select functional areas and their processes. We started the subject assessment on January 27, 2012. We conducted a quality review of the seven functional areas and their processes, based on ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management System Requirements, at the DAU administered by one of three groups: Performance and Resource Management (PRM), Operations Support Group (OSG), and Information Systems (IS). We conducted the reviews of Finance, Contracting, Micro-Purchases and Training Requisitions, and IS separately. We combined the areas of Property Management, Supply Management, and Real Property Management and Facilities Maintenance because they are all under the OSG. We produced a status report at the completion of each functional area review that identified any findings or opportunities for improvement for DAU. DAU had 30 days to review and comment on each status report. Appendix B of this report contains each report and DAU's comments. The individual functional area reports outline the detailed methodology used to assess the processes in that area. This overarching report of the seven functional areas identifies only the systemic issues found.

This Manual reissues DoD 4165.63-M (Reference (a)) in accordance with the guidance in DoD Instruction (DODI) 4165.63 (Reference (b)) and the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (c)) to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures on all matters associated with military housing. It also addresses DoD responsibilities for privatized lodging. This Manual applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense.

This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Instruction 5040.6, "Life Cycle Management of DoD Visual Information (VI)," April 10, 2001 (Reference (a)). It contains instructions for identifying and handling specific types of visual information (VI), as well as for the acts and procedures necessary to select VI for permanent retention in a records center or archival agency. It also contains guidance for camera operators, the Component Accessioning Points (CAPs), and others who generate and handle VI during its life cycle. This Manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizations in the Department of Defense.

This Guide is issued under the authority of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 8320.2, "Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense," December 2, 2004 (Reference (a)). It provides implementation guidance for the community-based transformation of existing and planned information technology (IT) capabilities across the Department of Defense (DoD) in support of Department-wide net-centric operations. This Guide applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.

This Manual (DoD 6015.1-M) is reissued under the authority of DoD Instruction 6015.23, "Delivery of Healthcare at Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs)," December 9, 1996. It prescribes a uniform glossary of healthcare terminology for use throughout the Department of Defense. This Manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the TRICARE Management Activity, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities.

We conducted this assessment in conjunction with our responsibilities under 10 U.S.C. Section 1566, and in accordance with provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended. As indicated, the FVAP is a major multidimensional program impacting numerous Federal, state, and local agencies and jurisdictions, and is subject to repetitive examination and reporting by various Federal oversight organizations. These oversight reports have focused on program compliance with law or regulation and assessed program effectiveness. Collectively, the reports form a substantial body of work to which senior public officials and those charged with governance can refer in shaping their decisions and actions. The IG Act of 1978 requires DoDIG to avoid duplication by coordinating with the GAO, other Federal IGs, Military Service IGs, and other Federal entities. To avoid duplication and repetition-and accomplish the DoDIG mission-we used a continuous assessment methodology consistent with routine multi-organizational oversight of complex programs impacting entities and jurisdictions worldwide. The methodology includes on-going: analysis of previous and on-going oversight activity and reporting, risk assessment based on data reliability and management control, dialog with senior public officials and stakeholders at all levels, active consideration of stakeholder feedback, and separate reporting focused on individual program elements. Our most recent voting-related report, issued earlier this year, Assessment of Voting Assistance Programs for Calendar Year 2011 (Report No. DoDIG-2012-068, March 30, 2012), focused on the voting assistance programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as reported by their Inspectors General. This report focuses on: the sufficiency of survey data used to manage and assess voting assistance program effectiveness; compliance with the MOVE Act requirement to establish a voting assistance office on every military installation worldwide. The objectives of our assessment were to determine whether voting assistance programs carried out under the Uniformed and Overseas Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), as amended, and subsequently modified by the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act: complied with the law and DoD implementing instructions, were effective in meeting the law's intent.

This Regulation is authorized by DoD Instruction 4715.6, "Environmental Compliance," April 24, 1996 (reference (a)). This Regulation implements Section 213(d) of the Clean Water Act (Section 1322 of title 33, United States Code (U.S.C.) (reference (b)) by issuing standards governing the design, construction, installation, and operation of marine sanitation devices (MSDs) in pubic vessels owned or operated by the Department of Defense. This regulation also implements Annex I of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, including the 1978 Protocol thereto (MARPOL Protocol) (reference (c)), in accordance with the requirements of Section 3(g) of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (Section 1902(g) of title 33, U.S.C. (reference (d)), by prescribing standards under which warships, naval auxiliaries and other public vessels owned or operated by the Department of Defense shall prevent oil pollution.

Pursuant to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8260.03 (Reference (a)), the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5124.02 (Reference (b)), and in accordance with DoDD 8320.03 (Reference (c)), this Manual implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures and rules for the electronic documentation of force structure data across the DoD. This Volume sets forth responsibilities and procedures for implementation of the OFSC for authorized force structure in GFM DI Organization Servers (Oss) and for task organized force structure in systems that consume OS data. This Volume applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.

This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Instruction 7750.07 (Reference (a)). It implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides specific procedures for management of the DoD Forms Management Program. This Manual applies to: OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). The creation, coordination, printing, control, revision, cancellation, distribution, and use of forms within the Department of Defense; the processing and use of exceptions to existing forms; and the management of all forms regardless of medium (paper or electronic) or designation (data elements or fields, format, or information management tools). These forms include DoD (DD) Forms, Standard Forms (SFs), Optional Forms (OFs), and DoD Component forms (e.g., Secretary of Defense (SD) and Department of the Army (DA) Forms).

This Regulation is reissued under the authority of DoD Directive 5400.7. "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program," September 29, 1997. It provides guidance on the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, as amended by the "Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996." This Regulation applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities.

This Manual is reissued under the authority of DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of Information Requirements," June 11, 1993. It provides guidance to program managers and action officers who need to obtain information from the public, other Federal Agencies, or the DoD Components and provides them with the procedures necessary to license their information requirements. It also provides guidance to assist information management control officers on the operation of their reports management programs.

This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures," February 23, 1991. It prescribes policies and procedures for DoD acquisition and management of technical data.

In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)) and the guidance in DoDD 4715.1E (Reference (b)) and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6055.1 (Reference (c)), this Manual, "Safety Standards for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories," prescribes the technical safety requirements for the Department of Defense to use, handle, transport, transfer, store, or dispose of infectious agents and toxins (IAT): rated at biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) and above; used in microbiological activities in biomedical and biological research settings, microbiology teaching laboratories, and veterinary reference laboratories. This manual applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense; all DoD biomedical and biological research settings, microbiology teaching laboratories, veterinary reference laboratories, and nonclinical facilities that use, handle, transport, transfer, store or dispose of IAT; deployable, semi-permanent, or permanent laboratories deployed in support of a geographic Combatant Command for the analysis and surveillance of IAT that use, handle, transport, transfer, store or dispose of IAT.

This Regulation, "DoD Health Information Privacy Regulation," is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 6025.18, "Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information in DoD Health Care Programs," December 19, 2002 (reference (a)). It prescribes the uses and disclosures of protected health information. This Regulation is based on the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Public Law 104-191 (reference (b)). Although it covers much of the same ground as the Privacy Act of 1974 (reference (c)), this Regulation in no way impacts the need for the Department of Defense to comply with reference (c) which has been implemented within DoD by DoD 5400.11-R (reference (d)). This Regulation applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Defense) was established at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The Task Force was directed to "focus on protection of information interests of national importance through the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability in several areas, including deterrence." Specifically, the Task Force was asked to: Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information infrastructure; Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities; Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information users of national interest; Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures, processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national interest; Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert, in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability; Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations. Information infrastructures are vulnerable to attack. While this in itself poses a national security threat, the linkage between information systems and traditional critical infrastructures has increased the scope and potential of the information warfare threat. For economic reasons, increasing deregulation and competition create an increased reliance on information systems to operate, maintain, and monitor critical infrastructures. This in turn creates a tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict. Information warfare offers a veil of anonymity to potential attackers. Attackers can hide in the mesh of inter-netted systems and often use previously conquered systems to launch their attacks. Information warfare is also relatively cheap to wage, offering a high return on investment for resource-poor adversaries. The technology required to mount attacks is relatively simple and ubiquitous. During information warfare, demand for information will dramatically increase while the capacity of the information infrastructure will most certainly decrease. The law, particularly international law, is currently ambiguous regarding criminality in and acts of war on information infrastructures. This ambiguity, coupled with a lack of clearly designated responsibilities for electronic defense hinders the development of remedies and limits response options. The current Administration's national security strategy for the United States suggests that the nation's "economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable" and that "we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests-political, military and economic-without active engagement in world affairs." In the broad sense, then, the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities are those political, military, and economic interests. These include the continuity of a democratic form of government and a free market economy, the ability to conduct effective diplomacy, a favorable balance of trade, and a military force that is ready to fight and that can be deployed where needed. Some of these activities are critical to the nation's political, military, and economic interests. These critical functional activities, in turn, depend on information technology and critical infrastructures such as banking and finance, electric power, telecommunications, and transportation.

This publication represents the final report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield. This DSB Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information display for assimilation. The Task Force was instructed to focus on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations. The global security environment provided the background for understanding the information needs of warfighting commanders in scenarios likely to occur in the coming decade. Based upon this environment, the Task Force assessed four aspects of information architecture for the battlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive; the business practices of the Department of Defense (DoD) in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and the underlying technology required to deveop and implement these systems. This report provides detailed analysis and supporting rationale for the finding and recommendations of the Task Force. Some of the finding include that: the warfighter must be an informed customer, with an integral role in the determination of the operational output (specification of requirements), acquisition, and implementation of information systems; warfighters require flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted and/or altered to accomplish different missions; DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare, but so are those of potential adversaries; and the DoD can greatly leverage limited DoD resources by exploiting available commercial practices and technology plus "buying into" commercial practices.

This Handbook is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," December 13, 1996. Its purpose is to assist in the development of the security classification guidance required under paragraph 2-500 of DoD 5200.1-R, for each system, plan, program, or project in which classified information is involved.

Over the past decade, actions of U. S. Forces personnel and contractors working for DOD overseas involving sexual slavery, human trafficking, and debt bondage attracted media attention and motivated Congressional action. Prior to 2000, instances of sexual slavery, sex with minors, and human trafficking involving U. S. contractors in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to administrative and criminal investigations. In 2002, a local television news program aired a report that women trafficked from the Philippines, Russia, and Eastern Europe were forced into prostitution in bars in South Korea frequented by U. S. military personnel. In 2004, reports chronicled allegations of forced labor and debt bondage against U. S. contractors in Iraq, leading to foreign embassy involvement. These incidents were contrary to U. S. Government policy regarding official conduct and reflected poorly on DOD. This report is the first in a series, and it discusses results of our review of contracts awarded in FY 2009. We announced this project on August 5, 2009. Our objective was to review a sample of DOD contracts for compliance with the "Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000," 22 U.S. C 78 (2009), as amended, and to summarize DOD CTIP investigative efforts. We examined a sample of contracts solicited, awarded, and administered by Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force command in the U. S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, specifically, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and U. S. Territory of Guam. Subsequent reports will cover additional Combatant Command geographical areas of responsibility. Our contracts sample consisted of construction and service contracts, each with a total value of $5 million or more and awarded in FY 2009. We believe that this sample met the "heightened risk" standard stated in the statute.

This Manual is composed of four volumes, each containing its own purpose. The purpose of the overall Manual, as authorized by DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)) and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.01 (Reference (b)), is to reissue DoD 5200.1-R (Reference (c)) as a DoD Manual to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for the designation, marking, protection, and dissemination of controlled unclassified information (CUI) and classified information, including information categorized as collateral, sensitive compartmented information (SCI), and Special Access Programs (SAP). This guidance is developed in accordance with Reference (b), Executive Order (E.O) 13526, E.O. 13556, and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (References (d), (e), and (f)). This combined guidance is known as the DoD Information Security Program. This Volume (Volume 2) provides guidance for the correct marking of classified information.