Bøger af Herbert M. Kritzer

What drives the process of how states select and retain judges? Using twenty-two detailed case studies, Kritzer examines how the competing goals of legal professionalism and politics influence decisions on choosing state court judges. This book will appeal to anyone interested in judicial and state politics, public policy, and law.

Justices on the Ballot addresses two central questions in the study of judicial elections: how have state supreme court elections changed since World War II? And, what effects have those changes had on election outcomes, state supreme court decisions, and the public's view of the courts? To answer these questions, Herbert M. Kritzer takes the broadest scope of any study to date, investigating every state supreme court election between 1946 and 2013. Through an analysis of voting returns, campaign contributions and expenditures, television advertising, and illustrative case studies, he shows that elections have become less politicized than commonly believed. Rather, the changes that have occurred reflect broader trends in American politics, as well as increased involvement of state supreme courts in hot-button issues.

Americans have a long-standing reputation for relying upon the legal system to deal with all manner of problems and issues; litigiousness is often seen as an American disease. Yet 99% of legal cases started in the courts never even make it through the courthouse door, because formal court action is never initiated. Instead, participants reach an out-of-court settlement. What does this dominance of negotiated settlement over adjudication mean? Has "Equal Justice Under Law" given way to "Let's Make a Deal"? So far, most of the evidence from judges and lawyers, policy makers and researchers has been anecdotal, and the public image of complex legal machinations and back-room deals derives from a few spectacular and atypical cases. Based on findings from the Civil Litigation Research Project, begun in 1979 and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Herbert Kritzer has constructed a coherent picture of the routine of ordinary litigation. He shows, for instance, that the vast bulk of "ordinary cases" that account for most claims in federal and state courts are rather "cut-and-dried" affairs that deal with relatively modest amounts of money--important information for the proponents of litigation reform. He examines the economics of bargaining, for both lawyers and their clients, and the extent to which litigation is governed by monetary concerns. Evaluating the models of negotiation and game theory that are currently in vogue, Kritzer posits a more useful typology for understanding what actually happens when lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants sit down to "make a deal." His illuminating insights into the divergent interests of attorneys and clients correct many of the assumptions of standard economic theories of litigation and bargaining.

Herbert Kritzer addresses a number of questions about contingency fee legal practice and argues that to be successful, contingency fee lawyers must generate a portfolio of cases similar to an investment portfolio with its associated risk.