Bøger af Marcus Mietzner

In The Coalitions Presidents Make, Marcus Mietzner explains how Indonesia has turned its volatile post-authoritarian presidential system into one of the world's most stable. He argues that since 2004, Indonesian presidents have deployed nuanced strategies of coalition building to consolidate their authority and these coalitions are responsible for the regime stability in place today. In building coalitions, Indonesian presidents have looked beyond parties and parliament--the traditional partners of presidents in most other countries. In Indonesia, actors such as the military, the police, the bureaucracy, local governments, oligarchs, and Muslim groups are integrated into presidential coalitions by giving them the same status as parties and parliament. But while this inclusiveness has made Indonesia's presidential system extraordinarily durable, it has also caused democratic decline. In order to secure the stability of their coalitions, presidents must observe the vested interests of each member when making policy decisions. The Coalitions Presidents Make details the process through which presidents balance their own powers and interests with those of their partners, encouraging patronage-oriented collaboration and disincentivizing confrontation.

"The book explains why Indonesia's presidential system turned from an extraordinarily unstable polity one into one of the world's most solid. It did so, the book argues, because constitutional changes incentivized the creation of coalitional presidentialism arrangements that bind a wide variety of political forces to the status quo"--

The book description text is repeated (2 times, one after the other). Rather than you reading through the description to determine where the repeat starts, please replace the description with the following: Around the globe, populists have used the decline of established political parties and widespread societal fears of globalization to launch increasingly successful electoral campaigns. Indonesia is no exception. In the 2014 presidential elections, two populists even competed against each other--albeit with vastly different concepts of populism. Prabowo Subianto, the wealthy former son-in-law of ex-autocrat Suharto, offered a classic populist paradigm based on anti-foreign rhetoric, condemnation of the status quo, appeal to the poor, and neo-authoritarian reform plans. By contrast, his opponent, the down-to-earth former carpenter and Jakarta governor, Joko Widodo ("Jokowi"), advanced a new form of technocratic populism that was inclusive, nonconfrontational, and primarily focused on improving the quality of public service delivery. This study explores the dynamics of the electoral contest between Prabowo and Jokowi, and analyzes what they tell us about the conditions under which populist campaigns are launched and succeed or fail. It shows that Prabowo's campaign was ultimately defeated because Indonesia's post-Suharto democracy was not in a state of acute, life-threatening crisis. However, the issue also illuminates Jokowi's struggle to establish his populist rule after his inauguration as president, with oligarchic forces and other members of the old elite forcefully trying to intrude into his new government.

In 2016, Freedom House recorded the eleventh consecutive year of declining democratic freedoms, adding material to the growing political science literature on a global democratic recession. Southeast Asia is no exception in this regard. During the last decade, one previously democratic country experienced a full democratic reversal (Thailand), another has seen the rise of a populist with openly neo-authoritarian tendencies (the Philippines) and yet another has begun a slow but perceptible process of democratic deconsolidation (Indonesia). At the same time, semi-authoritarian regimes such as Singapore and Malaysia have defied predictions of a possible democratic trajectory and the fully authoritarian regimes of Vietnam, Laos and Brunei have firmly held on to power. Initially hopeful democratic transitions, finally, have ended either in autocracy (Cambodia) or in uncertainty (Myanmar). What explains this failure of democratization efforts in Southeast Asia? Why have autocracies proved so resistant to democratic opening? And what can the Southeast Asian experience tell us about the drivers of the global democratic recession.

Presents an account of military's struggle to adapt to the fresh democratic system after the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. This book emphasizes the importance of conflicts among civilians in determining the extent of military involvement in political affairs.