Bøger af Rod Thornton

Military organizations have to change with the times. But organizations, of course, resist change; military organizations resist change more than most; and, it can be argued, Russian military organizations resist change more than most military organizations. This is clear from the pace of the post-Cold War attempts to reform the Russian ground forces. Historically, this was an army that, in many ways, sacrificed the need for military efficiency in order to perform a role as the inculcator of Soviet values into young conscripts. Social engineering then mattered almost more than military skill. But today, in the era of high-tech weaponry and expeditionary warfare, armies all across the world can no longer remain simply as 2-year repositories for unmotivated conscript soldiers. Thus it has long been recognized in Moscow's political circles that the "citizen-army" must be replaced by modern, flexible, and well-trained ground forces. The Russian leadership believes that such forces would better protect the country and serve the government as an adjunct to its foreign and security policy. Indeed, it is the likes of President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev who have been the main instigators of reform-wanting their armed forces to be more capable operationally. The politicians have been facing the resistance of conservative generals, and for several years there has been stalemate in the reform process. However, the war with Georgia in 2008 showed the overall weaknesses of the Russian military, and thus undermined the opposition of the generals. Significant change could now come. The Russian ground forces are therefore now undergoing quite significant reform in terms of structure, deployability, and overall philosophy. U.S. military planners must be mindful that, if all that is anticipated comes to pass, these Russian ground forces are now set to shake off many of their old Soviet failings and deficiencies.

The airborne divisions are undoubtedly the most impressive formations within the Russian army. The troops of the airborne forces (VDV) are the best trained and most professional in the army. Unlike their Western airborne counterparts, they are capable of fielding both armored personnel carriers and artillery assets. That affords them additional battlefield protection and firepower. VDV forces also have shown themselves- as in the 2008 war with Georgia-able to respond very quickly in crisis situations. Indeed, the airborne troops performed very creditably overall in Georgia. Such disciplined and professional airborne forces will likely form the vanguard of any interventionary operation beyond Russia's borders. Other than Georgia, the last time VDV forces were employed operationally abroad was in Kosovo in 1999. It was there at Pristina International Airport that VDV troops had a potentially explosive showdown with British paratroopers. That may not be the last time lead elements of U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces come face-to-face with the VDV. Given that such confrontations cannot be ruled out in the future, Russia's current airborne forces need to be understood. This monograph examines the VDV and seeks to highlight what makes its formations such noteworthy potential allies or opponents. In particular, the monograph looks at the process of organizational change that the VDV has undergone since the war with Georgia.

This monograph considers the recent history of organizational change in the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV). In particular, it looks at how the VDV has changed since the end of Russia's conflict with Georgia in 2008. The VDV, a force much admired in Russian media and society has, in fact, escaped fairly lightly during the comprehensive reform of the Russian Army more generally over the last few years. In large part this has been down to the personality of the current head of the VDV, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov. Close to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Shamanov--a "maverick"--has used his political connections to help ward off many of the cuts and reforms that have impacted the rest of the Army. He has managed to keep the basic structure of the VDV intact, while also dealing with a number of problematic issues related to manning, equipment, and training regimes within his organization. This monograph goes on to point out the level of professionalism in the VDV that was demonstrated during the Georgian war. It also though, highlights the fact that, while some battalions within the VDV will be very effective and well trained, other battalions will not. Thus it is difficult to judge precisely how battle-ready the VDV's divisions now are. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to establish just what sort of Russian airborne forces U.S. or NATO troops may one day have to either work alongside or, indeed, face in some sort of confrontation.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of the Russian armed forces.