Bøger af Samuel Charap

U.S. policy choices made at the conclusions of past wars have had enduring consequences. Although there is no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war at the time of this writing in late 2023, U.S. policymakers should begin considering postwar Russia strategy now. The authors of this report address this issue through an alternative futures analysis. Planning for after the war is complicated by significant uncertainty: Neither the conflict's trajectory nor the international climate at the war's end can be predicted with confidence. Given this uncertainty, the implications of U.S. strategic choices must be explored in different contexts. The authors develop two ideal-type postwar worlds, as defined by the outcome of the war and the character of the broader international environment: a less favorable world and a more favorable world. They also propose two ideal-type options for postwar U.S. strategy toward Russia, a hardline approach and a less hardline approach. Then, they consider how each strategy would play out in each world over the course of the decade after the war ends, yielding four alternative futures. They draw on the history of U.S.-Russia relations and the literatures on rivalries, interstate conflict, and alliances to assess the implications of each future for U.S. interests.

"Even before Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia had many ongoing and potential disputes with other countries, motivated by a variety of territorial, political, and economic issues. Furthermore, as Moscow has sought to expand its international role, it has increased Russian involvement in civil conflicts, using both overt and covert means. Russian activity in Syria and Libya has raised the prospect that the United States might find itself militarily entangled with Russia in various global hotspots. Therefore, the authors of this report sought to identify possible Russian flashpoints with countries in and near the U.S. Army Europe area of responsibility that could entangle the United States and present distinct military challenges to the U.S. Army. Using quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze historical data on Russian disputes and conflicts, the authors identified the key drivers of such flashpoints. They then leveraged these findings to derive planning implications for the United States and the U.S. Army in particular. The authors also examined two additional potential drivers of conflict not captured in historical data--Russia's use of private military contractors and its operations in the information environment--to see whether either might lead to a flashpoint in the future."--

Prior to the events of February 2022, political interference was one of the most significant challenges in Russia-West relations. These proceedings reflect a series of discussions among U.S., Russian, and European Union nongovernmental experts who were convened in 2020-2021 to discuss mutual concerns regarding political interference and to find common ground on measures to address them. Even before February 2022, the European Union, the United States, and Russia had divergent interests, values, and worldviews, as well as significant mutual grievances. Despite these divergences and grievances, the assembled experts came to the view that all parties would have benefited from the establishment of mutually agreed-upon measures to mitigate the destabilizing impacts of political interference. In a text agreed on in January 2022, the expert group proposed the following measures: (1) increase transparency regarding interpretations of prohibited interference, (2) enhance dialogue on interference, (3) establish self-restraint commitments (regarding election-related infrastructure and hack-and-leak operations), (4) develop technical measures to demonstrate compliance with self-restraint commitments, (5) create guidelines to limit cross-border manipulation of social media, (6) relax restrictions on foreign broadcasters, and (7) formulate declarations of intent not to interfere.

Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. It is, however, far from clear what Russia intends to signal through these actions. Different understandings of Moscow's objectives could lead to dramatically divergent interpretations of events. In the first comprehensive analysis of Russian coercive signaling toward the United States and its allies, the authors of this report analyze these activities over recent years to provide a better understanding of the drivers of Moscow's behavior and practical guidelines for assessing future events. The authors posit several hypotheses regarding Russian motives and evaluated them using three methods: an examination of Russian strategic writing and leadership statements on the topic, a quantitative modeling effort, and qualitative case studies of specific incidents. The authors found solid empirical grounds to make judgments about Russia's motives. They suggest that much of the assertive, dangerous, or unsafe Russian activity appears to be directed at shaping specific patterns of ongoing U.S. or allied behavior. Moscow appears to be using coercive signals to send targeted messages regarding activities that it finds problematic. Most Russian proactive activities, such as scheduled exercises or strategic bomber training flights, convey general deterrence signals and do not pose immediate safety concerns. Using their analysis of past Russian behavior, the authors provide tools to discern the possible motives behind future activities. The research for this report was conducted in calendar year 2020. The draft was completed in March 2021.

In this study, RAND researchers examined the current role of security cooperation efforts as a tool in the emerging strategic competition among the United States, Russia, and China.

The authors examine the nature of the emerging era of international competition, assess the perspectives of the major powers?beginning with the primary challengers to the U.S.-led international order?and evaluate various characteristics for each country.

Despite Russia's relatively small global economic footprint, it has engaged in more interventions than any other U.S. competitor since 1991. In this report, the authors assess when, where, and why Russia conducts military interventions.

What is Russia's declared grand strategy? How do its actions and resource decisions match its declarations? The authors of this report offer answers to these questions and suggest implications for U.S. policymakers.

Through interviews, workshops, and structured analysis on the causes of potential conflict, the authors of this report outline new conventional arms control (CAC) measures to lower the risk of conflict in Europe. The existing CAC regime is outdated and largely irrelevant to today''s security environment. The authors provide a menu of options for a new CAC regime that could address the regional security challenges of the 21st century.

The perspectives collected in these conference proceedings explore alternatives to the current approaches to the regional order for the states "in between" the West and Russia-Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

"First published January 2017 by Routledge ... for The International Institute for Strategic Studies."