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This document discusses emergent health and safety issues for the volunteer fire and emergency services

As part of the second needs assessment of the U.S. fire service, a rough comparison was made between needs reported in the first needs assessment survey and resources requested and granted to the same fire departments in 2001-2004 under the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.

This Job Aid is a guide to assist leaders of the Emergency Services Sector (ESS) with the process of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). The document intends only to provide a model process or template for the systematic protection of critical infrastructures.

This report details the response of the Mobile, Alabama Fire Department (MFD) to the derailment of a passenger train in a remote section of the Big Bayou Canot, nine miles north of Mobile

In 1988, the State of South Carolina kicked off a public fire safety program entitled "Get Alarmed, South Carolina!" The program has been credited in 1990 with helping the State record the lowest number of fire deaths in five years and to begin the reverse a trend in recent years toward higher and higher fire death rates. The story of the "Get Alarmed, South Carolina!" program and other South Carolina public fire safety efforts since 1988 offer lessons which may be helpful to other States.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.

This report continues a series of annual studies by the USFA of on-duty firefighter fatalities in the United States. The USFA is the single public agency source of information for all on-duty firefighter fatalities in the United States each year. The unique and specific objective of this study is to identify all on-duty firefighter fatalities that occurred in the United States and its protectorates in 2005, and to present in summary form the circumstances surrounding each occurrence. The study is intended to help identify approaches that could reduce the number of firefighter deaths in future years. In addition to the 2005 overall findings, this study includes information on firefighter accountability programs.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), "Management of Domestic Incidents," which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This consistency provides the foundation for utilization of NIMS for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. HSPD-5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and to use it in their individual incident management programs and activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State, tribal, and local governments. The directive requires Federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities). NIMS recognizes the role that NGOs and the private sector have in preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents. Building on the foundation provided by existing emergency management and incident response systems used by jurisdictions, organizations, and functional disciplines at all levels, NIMS integrates best practices into a comprehensive framework for use nationwide by emergency management/response personnel in an all-hazards context. These best practices lay the groundwork for the components of NIMS and provide the mechanisms for the further development and refinement of supporting national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems, and technologies. NIMS fosters the development of specialized technologies that facilitate emergency management and incident response activities, and allows for the adoption of new approaches that will enable continuous refinement of the system over time. The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the National Integration Center (NIC), Incident Management Systems Integration Division (formerly known as the NIMS Integration Center), publishes the standards, guidelines, and compliance protocols for determining whether a Federal, State, tribal, or local government has implemented NIMS.Additionally, the Secretary, through the NIC, manages publication and collaboratively, with other departments and agencies, develops standards, guidelines, compliance procedures, and protocols for all aspects of NIMS. This document was developed through a collaborative intergovernmental partnership with significant input from the incident management functional disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector.

Immigrants from all over the world have been drawn for centuries to the United States, and their contributions continue to strengthen this great nation. Enriching our national character, immigrants bring vitality and optimism to both our economy and society. A nation based not on ethnicity, race, religion, or culture, the United States of America is a country in which people from every background come together to govern themselves in a political framework inclusive of all. Americans have embraced the opportunities and met the challenges associated with each successive wave of immigration. Several recent factors point to the need for a concerted national effort to ensure the successful assimilation of our current wave of immigrants. Today's immigrants are coming to the United States in record numbers, from diverse countries of origin, and some are settling in new gateway communities without long immigrant-receiving traditions. These trends warrant action from all sectors of society to foster the integration of immigrants into American civic culture. All of us have a vested interest in reengaging and preserving the fundamental civic principles and values that bind immigrants and citizens alike. The result of such efforts builds universal attachment to America's core civic values, strengthens social and political cohesion, and will help the United States continue to prosper as a nation of immigrants bound by an enduring promise of freedom grounded in democracy, liberty, equal opportunity, and respect for the rule of law. Recognizing a historic opportunity to emphasize the importance of immigrant integration, on June 7, 2006, President George W. Bush created by executive order the Task Force on New Americans (Task Force). The Task Force brought together a wide variety of federal agencies to strengthen the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies to help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully become Americans. The efforts of the Task Force centered on the idea that assimilation is an opportunity to renew America's political values and enrich communities by celebrating the bonds that unite us all. The Task Force was guided by two themes that have uniquely defined America's immigration experience: Diversity within Unity: Diversity makes America strong, but unity keeps America successful. In advocating patriotic assimilation, the Task Force refers to a unifying civic identity that respects diversity, including individual religious and cultural traditions, but does not use these elements to define the identity of the political community. American identity is political and is composed of three key elements: 1) embracing the principles of American democracy; 2) identifying with U.S. history; and 3) communicating in English. Citizenship Is an Identity: Citizenship is an identity and not simply a benefit. Feeling and being perceived as part of the political community is an important indicator of a person's integration into a society. As a result of roundtable discussions, site visits, and the collective experience and research of Task Force members, the Task Force on New Americans recommends strengthening assimilation efforts across the nation and among all sectors of society. The integration efforts described in this report are a federal call to action that defines a modern-day Americanization movement. The Task Force on New Americans calls for the following: 1. An Americanization Movement for the Twenty first Century, 2. Viewing Integration as a Two-way Street, 3. Improved Legislation on Integration and Citizenship, 4. Federal Celebration of Citizenship, 5. Federal Leadership on Integration, 6. Enhanced E-learning Tools for Adults, 7. Encouraging the Private Sector to Promote, Integration, 8. Mobilizing the Volunteer Community, 9. Increasing Integration Stakeholders, 10. Broadened Analysis and Evaluation of Integration.

Of the 500,000 or so detectable earthquakes that occur on Planet Earth each year, people will "feel" about 100,000 of them and about 100 will cause damage. Although most earthquakes are moderate in size and destructive potential, a severe earthquake occasionally strikes a community that is not adequately prepared and thousands of lives and billions of dollars in economic investment are lost. For example, a great earthquake and the fires it initiated destroyed much of San Francisco in 1906 and a significant portion of Anchorage, Alaska, was destroyed by a large earthquake in 1964. Within the past 200 years, major destructive earthquakes also occurred in Charleston, South Carolina, and Memphis, Tennessee. Within the past 50 years, smaller but damaging earthquakes occurred several times in both Los Angeles and Seattle. Overall, more than 20 states have a moderate or high risk of experiencing damaging earthquakes. Earthquakes are truly a national problem. One of the key ways a community protects itself from potential earthquake disasters is by adopting and enforcing a building code with appropriate seismic design and construction standards. The seismic requirements in U.S. model building codes and standards are updated through the volunteer efforts of design professionals and construction industry representatives under a process sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and administered by the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC). At regular intervals, the BSSC develops and FEMA publishes the NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program) Recommended Seismic Provisions for New Buildings and Other Structures (referred to in this publication as the NEHRP Recommended Seismic Provisions or simply the Provisions). The Provisions serves as a resource used by the codes and standards development organizations as they formulate sound seismic-resistant design and construction requirements. The Provisions also provides design professionals, building officials, and educators with in-depth commentary on the intent and preferred application of the seismic regulations. The 2009 edition of the Provisions (FEMA P-750) and the building codes and consensus standards based on its recommendations are, of necessity, highly technical documents intended primarily for use by design professionals and others who have specialized technical training. This introduction to the NEHRP Recommended Seismic Provisions is intended to provide these interested individuals with a readily understandable explanation of the intent of the earthquake-resistant design and requirements of the Provisions. Chapter 1 explains the history and purpose of building regulation in the United States, including the process used to develop and adopt the nation's building codes and the seismic requirements in these codes. Chapter 2 is an overview of the performance intent of the Provisions. Among the topics addressed are the national seismic hazard maps developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); the seismic design maps adopted by the Provisions as a basis for seismic design; and seismic risk, which is a function of both the probability that a community will experience intense earthquake ground shaking and the probability that building construction will suffer significant damage because of this ground motion. Chapter 3 identifies the design and construction features of buildings and other structures that are important to good seismic performance. Chapter 4 describes the various types of structures and nonstructural components addressed by the Provisions. Chapter 5 is an overview of the design procedures contained in the Provisions. Chapter 6 addresses how the practice of earthquake-resistant design is likely to evolve in the future. A glossary of key technical terms, lists of notations and acronyms used in this report, and a selected bibliography identifying references that may be of interest to some readers complete this report.

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. National preparedness is the shared responsibility of our whole community. Every member contributes, including individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and Federal, state, and local governments. We describe our security and resilience posture through the core capabilities that are necessary to deal with great risks, and we will use an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation approach as our foundation. We define success as: "A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk." Using the core capabilities, we achieve the National Preparedness Goal by: Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism; Protecting our citizens, residents, visitors, and assets against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows our interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive; Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future disasters; Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident; Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities affected by a catastrophic incident. The core capabilities contained in the Goal are the distinct critical elements necessary for our success. They are highly interdependent and will require us to use existing preparedness networks and activities, improve training and exercise programs, promote innovation, and ensure that the administrative, finance, and logistics systems are in place to support these capabilities. The capability targets-the performance threshold(s) for each core capability-will guide our allocation of resources in support of our national preparedness. Individual and community preparedness is fundamental to our success. By providing the necessary knowledge and skills, we seek to enable the whole community to contribute to and benefit from national preparedness. This includes children, individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, diverse communities, and people with limited English proficiency. Their needs and contributions must be integrated into our efforts. Each community contributes to the Goal and strengthens our national preparedness by preparing for the risks that are most relevant and urgent for them individually. We have made great progress in building and sustaining our national preparedness. The Goal builds on these achievements, but our aspirations must be even higher to match the greatest risks facing our Nation. As we prepare for these challenges, our core capabilities will evolve to meet those challenges.

This National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. It is intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. This document explains the common discipline and structures that have been exercised and matured at the local, tribal, State, and national levels over time. It describes key lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing particularly on how the Federal Government is organized to support communities and States in catastrophic incidents. Most importantly, it builds upon the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The term "response" as used in this Framework includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery. The Framework is always in effect, and elements can be implemented as needed on a flexible, scalable basis to improve response.

When an organization moves away from a generations-long tradition of being all-male toward a future that includes men and women equally, a significant change takes place. Change can be upsetting and threatening to those who are used to, and invested in, the way things "have always been." Fire may know no gender, but people do, and the fire chief of the 1990's spends more time managing people than controlling fire. Increasing numbers of women are becoming firefighters and fire officers, entering and advancing in a field that is still heavily male by both population and tradition. Fire service leaders who are not prepared to manage these workforce changes may find their workforce is managing them instead. Fire chiefs used to feel comfortably progressive saying, "We'll hire anybody who meets our standards." But the underlying premise to that statement has now been challenged. How have those standards been set? Are they reasonable? Can all current members of the department meet them? What happens to someone who does meet the standards, but then faces a wall of hostility from their new coworkers? What support systems are available for those who are excluded from the privileges of the dominant group? What fire service leaders have learned, as first men of color and then women of color and white women have entered the field, is that policies that appear to be neutral, or policies that seem to apply equally to everyone, do not necessarily create equal opportunity. Altering the identity of people in a fundamentally unaltered workplace leaves the door open to friction, miscommunication and a host of interpersonal issues that can result in poor performance and a loss of teamwork, or worse. The commitment to equal opportunity in employment has evolved into a commitment to much more than that: to a workforce where diversity itself is valued. This book was developed to help the fire service leader manage the changing fire service workforce as it becomes progressively more inclusive of larger numbers of women in all ranks. It offers guidance and suggestions from people with experience and expertise, and provides choices and options more often than single "right" answers. The authors hope they have created a guide that, in calling on a wide range of resources, can be useful to a people with a wide range of needs.

Risk in the 21st century results from a complex mix of manmade and naturally occurring threats and hazards, including terrorist attacks, accidents, natural disasters, and other emergencies. Within this context, our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be directly exposed to the events themselves or indirectly exposed as a result of the dependencies and interdependencies among CIKR. Within the CIKR protection mission area, national priorities must include preventing catastrophic loss of life and managing cascading, disruptive impacts on the U.S. and global economies across multiple threat scenarios. Achieving this goal requires a strategy that appropriately balances resiliency - a traditional American strength in adverse times - with focused, risk-informed prevention, protection, and preparedness activities so that we can manage and reduce the most serious risks that we face. These concepts represent the pillars of our National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its 18 supporting Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs). The plans are carried out in practice by an integrated network of Federal departments and agencies, State and local government agencies, private sector entities, and a growing number of regional consortia - all operating together within a largely voluntary CIKR protection framework. This multidimensional public-private sector partnership is the key to success in this inherently complex mission area. Building this partnership under the NIPP has been a major accomplishment to date and has facilitated closer cooperation and a trusted relationship in and across the 18 CIKR sectors. Integrating multi-jurisdictional and multi-sector authorities, capabilities, and resources is a unified but flexible approach that can also be tailored to specific sector and regional risk landscapes and operating environments is the path to successfully enhancing our Nation's CIKR protection. The NIPP meets the requirements that the President set for in Homeland Security Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, and provides the overarching approach for integrating the Nation's many CIKR protection initiatives into a single national effort. It set for a comprehensive risk management framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners implementing the NIPP.

In May 2007, the National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) "National Continuity Policy" was issued by the President to provide and updated, integrated approach to maintain a national continuity capability in order to ensure the preservation of our form of Government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions under all conditions. In August 2007, the "National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan" was issued by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to build upon the "Policy" and provide guidance to executive branch departments and agencies in identifying and carrying out their Primary Mission Essential Function that support the eight National Essential Functions - the most critical functions necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during catastrophic emergency. This Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) implements the requirements of Federal Continuity Directive 1, ANNEX C. It provides guidance and direction to Federal executive branch departments and agencies for identification of their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and potential Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs). It includes guidance and checklists to assist departments and agencies in assessing their essential functions through a risk management process and in identifying potential PMEFs that support the National Essential Functions (NEFs) - the most critical functions necessary to lead and sustain the nation during a catastrophic emergency. The FCD provides direction on the formalized process for submission of a department's or agency's potential PMEFs that are supportive of the NEFs. It also includes guidance on the processes for conducting a Business Process Analysis (BPA) and Business Impact Analysis (BIA) for each of the potential PMEFs that assist in identifying essential function relationships and interdependencies, time sensitivities, threat and vulnerability analyses, and mitigation strategies that impact and support the PMEFs.

In May 2007, the National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) "National Continuity Policy" was issued by the President to establish and maintain a comprehensive and effective national continuity capability in order to ensure the preservation of our form of Government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions under all conditions. In August 2007, the President approve the "National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan" to build upon the "Policy" and provide guidance to executive departments and agencies on appropriately identifying and carrying out their Primary Mission Essential Function that support the eight National Essential Functions - the most critical functions necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during catastrophic emergency. This Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) provides direction to the Federal executive branch for developing continuity plans and programs. Continuity planning facilitates the performance of executive branch essential functions during all-hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. The ultimate goal of continuity in the executive branch is the continuation of National Essential Functions (NEFs).

By signing National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD 41/HSPD 13), President Bush underscored the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances." NSPD 41/HSPD 13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC)-the first coordinating committee specifically tasked to address this issue-to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and eight supporting implementation plans: The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the U.S. and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively. The International Outreach Strategy to Enhance Maritime Security provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends standardized procedures for restoration of maritime transportation systems following an incident of national significance. The Maritime Transportation Systems Security Plan provides strategic recommendations to holistically improve the security of maritime transportation systems. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain. The Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD 41/HSPD 13. Although these plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. Together, NSMS and its supporting plans represent the beginning of a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the Maritime Domain.

Edition 2.0. This counterterrorism Job Aid is designed to assist emergency response personnel in identifying a possible terrorist/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident and implementing initial actions. It identifies both strategic and tactical considerations that should be assessed within the first hour of an incident, providing clear, step-by-step checklists The Job Aid is designed to assist the first responder from the fire, EMS, Hazmat, CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive) and law enforcement disciplines who has already been trained in emergency response to serve as a quick reference. This includes both line personnel to unit officers and up to and including the initial Incident Commander (IC) (i.e., battalion chief, etc.).

This publication was prepared under the direction of Philip Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), U. S. Department of Homeland Security, with support from the NPPD Cyber Strategy Staff, the federally funded Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HS SEDI), and the NPPD Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C). In 2010, NPPD sponsored a government workshop to discuss a draft of this publication. Recommendations from that workshop have been incorporated. This publication explores a future - a "healthy cyber ecosystem" - where cyber devices collaborate in near-real time in their own defense. In this future, cyber devices have innate capabilities that enable them to work together to anticipate and prevent cyber attacks, limit the spread of attacks across participating devices, minimize the consequences of attacks, and recover to a trusted state. This publication presents three building blocks as foundational for a healthy cyber ecosystem: automation, interoperability, and authentication. The publication then considers how these building blocks contribute to ecosystem maturity and explores incentives for creating such a system. It concludes with thoughts on the way ahead. The envisioned end-state is focused specifically on capabilities that can be achieved in the near- and mid-term by utilizing standards-based software and information to strengthen self-defense through automated collective action. This publication is meant to provoke discussion and further exploration of the topic.

In accordance with National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13, the Secretary of State shall lead the coordination of the United States' international maritime security outreach efforts. The Department of State's International Outreach and Coordination Strategy to Enhance Maritime Security sets forth a plan to coordinate the United States' international outreach efforts regarding maritime security initiatives and to solicit international support for an improved global maritime security framework. The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy advances the policies set forth by President Bush in The National Security Strategy, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, and The National Strategy for Maritime Security and will help to accomplish the President's vision of a fully coordinated United States Government effort to protect our interests in the maritime domain. By signing National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) President Bush underscored the importance of securing the maritime domain, which is defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances."NSPD-41/HSPD-13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC)-the first coordinating committee specifically tasked to address this issue-to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and eight supporting implementation plans: The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the maritime domain. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan facilitates coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively. The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends standardized procedures for restoration of maritime transportation systems following an incident of national significance. Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations provide strategic context to holistically improve the security of the Marine Transportation System. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain. The Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13.Although these plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. Together, NSMS and its supporting plans represent the beginning of a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the Maritime domain.

The United States has made significant progress in securing the nation from terrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Nevertheless, work remains as the terrorist threats facing the country have evolved in the last ten years, and continue to change. Following 9/11, the federal government moved quickly to develop a security framework to protect our country from large-scale attacks directed from abroad, while enhancing federal, state, and local capabilities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from threats and disasters at home. A key element of this framework included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March, 2003, bringing together 22 separate agencies and offices into a single, Cabinet-level department. Created with the founding principle of protecting the American people from terrorist and other threats, DHS and its many partners across the Federal government, public and private sectors, and communities throughout the country have strengthened the homeland security enterprise to better mitigate and defend against dynamic threats. Many of the features of this new, more robust enterprise align with - and respond to - recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report, released in July 2004 to assess the circumstances surrounding 9/11 and to identify ways to guard against future terrorist attacks. In recognition of the 9/11 Commission Report and the tenth anniversary of 9/11, this report describes how DHS has addressed specific 9/11 Commission recommendations over the past ten years, making America stronger and more resilient. While challenges remain, the Department continues to focus on minimizing risks while maximizing the ability to respond and recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds. This is a challenge that the men and women of DHS commit themselves to everyday.

The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) is the official government source of information for civil users of the Global Positioning System (GPS). The Navigation Information Service (NIS) is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, for all Radio Navigation and maritime related needs via phone, fax or e-mail. The NIS provides users the ability to access real time or archived GPS, NDGPS, DGPS, and LNM information at http: //www.navcen.uscg.gov, as well as subscribe to an automated list service which enables users to receive GPS status messages and Notice to NAVSTAR User (NANU) messages via direct Internet e-mail. The NAVCEN also disseminates GPS, and DGPS safety advisory broadcast messages through USCG broadcast stations utilizing VHF-FM voice, HF-SSB voice, and NAVTEX broadcasts. The broadcasts provide the GPS and DGPS user in the marine environment with the current status of the navigation systems, as well as any planned/unplanned system outages that could affect GPS, and DGPS navigational accuracy. To comment on any of these services or ask questions about the service offered, contact the NAVCEN at: Commanding Officer U.S. Coast Guard NAVCEN (NIS) MS 7310 7323 Telegraph Road Alexandria, VA 20598-7310 Phone: (703) 313-5900 FAX: (703) 313-5920 Internet: http: //www.navcen.uscg.gov This Light List is corrected through Fifth Coast Guard District Local Notice to Mariners No. 52/15 and through National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Notice to Mariners No. 52/15 The 2016 edition supersedes the 2016 editi

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage to the coast along the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in an unprecedented relief, recovery, and reconstruction effort. This reconstruction presents a unique opportunity to rebuild the communities and public infrastructure using the latest hazard mitigation techniques proven to be more protective of lives and property. Critical facilities comprise all public and private facilities deemed by a community to be essential for the delivery of vital services, protection of special populations, and the provision of other services of importance for that community. This manual concentrates on a smaller group of facilities that are crucial for protecting the health and safety of the population: health care, educational, and emergency response facilities. The Design Guide for Improving Critical Facility Safety from Flooding and High Winds (FEMA 543) was developed with the support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This manual recommends incorporating hazard mitigation measures into all stages and at all levels of critical facility planning and design, for both new construction and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of existing facilities. It provides building professionals and decision makers with information and guidelines for implementing a variety of mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability to damage and disruption of operations during severe flooding and high-wind events. The underlying theme of this manual is that by building more robust critical facilities that will remain operational during and after a major disaster, people's lives and the community's vitality can be better preserved and protected. The poor performance of many critical facilities in the affected areas was not unique to Hurricane Katrina. It was observed in numerous hurricanes dating back more than three decades. Several reasons may explain this kind of performance. In many cases the damaged facilities were quite old and were constructed well before the introduction of modern codes and standards. Some of the older facilities were damaged because building components had deteriorated as a result of inadequate maintenance. Many fa¬cilities occupy unsuitable buildings that were never intended for this type of use. Some newer facilities suffered damage as a result of deficiencies in design and construction or the application of inappropriate design criteria and standards. The primary objective of this manual is to assist the building design community and local officials and decision makers in adopting and implementing sound mitigation measures that will decrease the vulnerability of critical facilities to major disasters. The goals of this manual are to: Present and recommend the use of building design features and building materials and methods that can improve the performance of critical facilities in hazard-prone areas during and after flooding and high-wind events. m Introduce and provide guidelines for implementing flooding and high-wind mitigation best practices into the process of design, construction, and operation and maintenance of critical facilities; and To aid in the reconstruction of the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, this manual presents an overview of the principal planning and design considerations for improving the performance of critical facilities during, and in the aftermath of, flooding and high-wind events. It provides design guidance and practical recommendations for protecting critical facilities and their occupants against these natural hazards. It presents incremental approaches that can be implemented over time to decrease the vulnerability of buildings, but emphasizes the importance of incorporating the requirements for mitigation against flooding and high winds into the planning and design of critical facilities from the very beginning of the process.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a National Incident Management System (NIMS). Initially published in March 2004, and revised in December 2008, the NIMS provides a consistent national approach for Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to work together to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. HSPD-5 directs Federal agencies to adopt NIMS and encourages adoption of NIMS by all other stakeholders-State, tribal, and local governments; private sector organizations; critical infrastructure owners and operators; and NGOs involved in emergency management. In addition, the adoption and implementation of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations is a condition for receiving Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, and other activities, as stated in HSPD-5. Based upon emergency management and incident response practices, NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. The institutionalization of these elements nationwide through training helps to mitigate risk by achieving greater preparedness. Incident after-action reports and NIMS both emphasize that successful implementation relies upon development and maintenance of a national NIMS training program. Furthermore, NIMS implementation relies upon comprehensive NIMS training and standardized personnel qualification. The primary goal of this guidance is to facilitate training and qualification of emergency management personnel to all NIMS concepts and principles. The NIMS Training Program identifies a deliberate method to develop and maintain a complete NIMS core curriculum and, concurrently, to provide training guidance to stakeholders for developing their training plans. To meet this goal, the NIMS Training Program has the following three objectives: 1. Support NIMS education and training for all emergency management personnel; 2. Adapt the functional capabilities defined by NIMS into guidelines, courses, and a curriculum that help stakeholders to develop personnel training and credentialing plans that yield the desired capabilities; 3. Define the minimum personnel qualifications required for service on complex multijurisdictional incidents nationwide. The NIMS Training Program lays out a conceptual framework that maintains a systematic process for the development of training courses and personnel qualifications. This process produces trained and qualified emergency management personnel. The framework facilitates the systematic development of these courses and qualifications by translating functional capabilities (defined in NIMS) into positions, core competencies, training, and personnel qualifications. The NIMS Training Program sets a sequence of goals, objectives, and action items for the NIC, which administers NIMS training nationally, and for stakeholders, who run their respective NIMS training and education programs.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Guideline for the Credentialing of Personnel (the guideline) to describe national credentialing standards and to provide written guidance regarding the use of those standards. This document describes credentialing and typing processes and identifies tools which Federal Emergency Response Officials (FERO) and emergency managers at all levels of government may use both routinely and to facilitate multijurisdictional coordinated responses. Through this guideline, DHS/FEMA encourages interoperability among Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private sector officials in order to facilitate emergency responder deployment for response, recovery, and restoration. This guideline also provides information about where emergency response leaders can obtain expertise and technical assistance in using the national standards or in ways they can adapt the standards to department, agency, jurisdiction, or organization needs. Each Federal agency with responsibilities under the National Response Framework is required to ensure that incident management personnel, emergency response providers, and other personnel (including temporary personnel) and resources likely needed to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster are credentialed and typed in accordance with 6 U.S.C. Section 320. In addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 5 (HSPD -5), Management of Domestic Incidents, requires that the heads of Federal departments and agencies adopt the National Incident Management System. DHS interprets these authorities to require agencies to ensure that their personnel are credentialed and typed according to these guidelines. Federal Legislative and Judicial Branches, State, local, tribal, private sector partners, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) are not required to credential their personnel in accordance with these guidelines. These non-Federal entities do not need to comply with the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201, an open technical standard used by Federal officials for uniform credentialing and access control or other Federal identification requirements for emergency response purposes. However, DHS/FEMA strongly encourages them to do so, in order to leverage the Federal investment in the FIPS 201 infrastructure and facilitating interoperability for personnel deployed outside their home jurisdiction.This document, developed and maintained by DHS/FEMA, is written for government executives; emergency management practitioners; private-sector, volunteer, and NGO leaders; and critical infrastructure (CI) owners and operators. It is addressed to senior elected and appointed leaders, such as Federal department and/or agency heads, State governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and city and/or county officials who have a responsibility to provide effective response. It also is intended for use by private-sector entities entering an impacted area to carry out their own response and recovery activities within the Incident Command System (ICS). For these users, this guideline is augmented with online access to supporting documents, further training, and an evolving resource for exchanging lessons learned.This guideline applies to incidents such as large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters where mutual aid and multijurisdictional aid is required. It can be useful for international cross-border initiatives undertaken by States and tribes.

This rapid visual screening procedure has been developed for use in assessing risk of terrorist attack on standard commercial buildings in urban or semi-urban areas, but it is also intended to be applicable nationwide for all conventional building types. It can be used to identify the level of risk for a single building, or the relative risk among buildings in a portfolio, community, or region as a prioritization tool for further risk management activities. The information gathered as part of this screening procedure can also be used to support and facilitate higher level assessments by expert investigators performing building-specific evaluations of threat, consequences, and vulnerability. Implementation of FEMA 452, Risk Assessment, A How-to Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, has demonstrated the need for a preliminary procedure to assess the risk of terrorist attack that is quick and simple to use. It has also shown that such a procedure needs to be usable by screeners who are knowledgeable about building systems, but not necessarily experts in anti-terrorism or structural design. This will reserve the use of experts for higher risk buildings requiring more detailed assessment when resources are limited. In this document, the concepts for rapid visual screening are combined with a risk-based procedure for manmade threats defined in FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, and FEMA 452, Risk Assessment, A How-to Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, from the FEMA Risk Management Series of publications. This handbook outlines a rapid visual screening procedure that quantifies the risk to a building due to a terrorist attack that is capable of causing catastrophic losses in terms of fatalities, injuries, damage, or business interruption. The primary purpose of this screening procedure is to prioritize the relative risk among a group of buildings in a portfolio or community but it can also be used to develop building-specific risk information. It is intended to be the first step in a tiered assessment process that includes successively more refined analyses when more detailed information is needed. Three generic types of terrorist threat are considered in this procedure. These include intrusion into the building, a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), and a chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) release. Quantification of relative risk is based on the methodology outlined in FEMA 426, in which risk is characterized as the product of three factors: consequences, threat, and vulnerability. In this rapid visual screening procedure, these three factors are evaluated using a Data Collection Form based on checklists and worksheets contained in FEMA 426 and FEMA 452. To make the screening procedure rapid, the assessment is limited to the most dominant features governing the overall risk to a building given a terrorist attack. In this procedure there is an emphasis on the vulnerability factor, due in part to the relatively significant level of control that the owner has with respect to this factor for a given building compared with the other two factors: threat and consequences.

The Marine Transportation System (MTS) generates nearly $750 billion of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product and handles 95% of all overseas trade. The MTS makes it possible for goods from other countries to be delivered to our front door step. It enables the U.S. to project military presence across the globe, creates jobs that support local economies, and provides a source of recreation for all Americans. Fundamentally, the Nation's economic and military security are closely linked to the health and functionality of the MTS. As a Nation, we must do more to protect the MTS. We must prevent terrorist attacks which could destroy critical infrastructure and key assets in the maritime domain, and disrupt the MTS. That is why Maritime Transportation System Security is an essential component to the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Improving security of the MTS while maintaining its functionality will not be an easy task. A complex system, the MTS is geographically diverse and composed of many types of assets, operations, and infrastructure that are operated and influenced by a diverse set of stakeholders, all of which play an important role in the system. In addition, the MTS is an open system which enables many users to use and benefit from it at minimal cost. The complexity and openness of the MTS make it efficient, however these characteristics also present many challenges to those trying to improve system security. By signing National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) (Maritime Security Policy, December 21, 2004) President Bush underscored the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, which is defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances." NSPD-41/HSPD-13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee-the first coordinating committee tasked specifically to address this issue-to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and eight supporting implementation plans: National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible; Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain; Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively; International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security; Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption; Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the President's call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework regarding the maritime domain; Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply Chain; Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13.

In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. This approach is unique and far reaching in that it, for the first time, eliminates critical seams and ties together a complete spectrum of incident management activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major natural disasters, and other major emergencies. The end result is vastly improved coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations to help save lives and protect America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of incident management. The NRP represents a true "national" framework in terms of both product and process. The NRP development process included extensive vetting and coordination with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency management communities across the country. The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services. The collective input we received from our public- and private-sector partners has been, and will continue to be, absolutely critical to the implementation and continued refinement of the core concepts included in this groundbreaking national plan. The NRP is built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident. The activation of the NRP and its coordinating structures and protocols-either partially or fully-for specific Incidents of National Significance provides mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of a wide variety of incident management and emergency assistance activities. Included in these activities are Federal support to State, local, and tribal authorities; interaction with nongovernmental, private donor, and private-sector organizations; and the coordinated, direct exercise of Federal authorities, when appropriate. The NRP is also an essential element of the broader policy coordination and reconciliation mechanisms of the Federal Government. The operational and resource coordinating structures described in the NRP are designed to support existing White House policy mechanisms and decision making entities during the response to a specific threat or incident. Also, while the NRP itself creates no new authorities, it serves to unify and enhance the incident management capabilities and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting under their own authorities in response to a wide array of potential threats and hazards. Implementation of the NRP and its supporting protocols will require extensive cooperation, collaboration, and information-sharing across jurisdictions, as well as between the government and the private sector at all levels. The Letter of Instruction included with the NRP provides specific guidance on the phased implementation of the plan.