Bøger af U S Government Accountability Office

"The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) overhauled requirements for how much time certain freight railroad workers can spend on the job (called "hours of service"). Changes included limiting the number of consecutive days on duty before rest is required, increasing minimum rest time from 8 to 10 hours, and requiring rest time to be undisturbed. RSIA also provided for pilot projects and waivers. RSIA's changes became effective for freight railroads in July 2009. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact of these changes on covered train and engine (T&E) employees, including implications for fatigue, (2) the impact of the changes on the rail industry, and (3) actions the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has taken to oversee compliance with hours of service requirements and implement RSIA provisions for pilot projects and waivers. To perform this work, GAO analyzed covered employee work schedules and used models to assess fatigue, surveyed the railroad industry, analyzed FRA inspection and enforcement data, and interviewed federal and railroad officials as well as fatigue and sleep experts. "

" Threats to federal information technology (IT) infrastructure and systems continue to grow in number and sophistication. The ability to make federal IT infrastructure and systems secure depends on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the federal and contractor workforce that implements and maintains these systems. In light of the importance of recruiting and retaining cybersecurity personnel, GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which federal agencies have implemented and established workforce planning practices for cybersecurity personnel and (2) the status of and plans for governmentwide cybersecurity workforce initiatives. GAO evaluated eight federal agencies with the highest IT budgets to determine their use of workforce planning practices for cybersecurity staff by analyzing plans, performance measures, and other information. GAO also reviewed plans and programs at agencies with responsibility for governmentwide cybersecurity workforce initiatives. "

"Funding for the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care is determined by Congress in the annual appropriations process. Prior to this process, VA develops a budget estimate of the resources needed to provide health care services to eligible veterans. The Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 requires GAO to assess whether the funding requested for VA health care in the President's budget requests submitted to Congress in 2011, 2012, and 2013 is consistent with VA's estimates of the resources needed to provide health care services. In anticipation of these future studies, GAO was asked to obtain information on how VA prepares its health care budget estimate. In this report, GAO describes (1) how VA develops its health care budget estimate, and (2) how VA's health care budget estimate is used in the President's budget request to Congress. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed VA documents on the methods, data, and assumptions used to develop VA's health care budget estimate that informed the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 and request for advance appropriations for fiscal year 2012. GAO also interviewed VA officials responsible for developing this estimate and staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is responsible for overseeing..."

"The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) to establish a 5-year demonstration project to integrate VA and DOD medical care into a first-ofits- kind Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) in North Chicago, Illinois. Expectations for the FHCC are outlined in an Executive Agreement signed by VA and DOD in April 2010. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 also directed GAO to annually evaluate various aspects of the FHCC integration. This report examines (1) what progress VA and DOD have made implementing the Executive Agreement to establish and operate the FHCC and (2) what plan, if any, VA and DOD have to assess FHCC provision of care and operations. GAO reviewed FHCC documents and conducted visits to the site; interviewed VA, DOD, and FHCC officials; and reviewed related GAO work. GAO recommends that DOD seek a legislative change to designate the FHCC as a military treatment facility (MTF)-a DOD facility providing medical or dental care to eligible individuals, and that VA and DOD direct FHCC leadership to further evaluate its integration performance reporting tool. DOD did not agree with the recommendation regarding the MTF designation, but GAO continues to believe such designation is important. VA and DOD agreed with..."

This is GAO's fifth annual assessment of NASA's major projects. This report provides a snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its major acquisitions. Due to persistent cost and schedule growth associated with its major projects, this area is on GAO's high risk list. GAO previously reported that NASA has taken steps to address its acquisition management issues and was making progress toward improving the cost and schedule performance of its major projects. This report provides observations about the cost and schedule performance of NASA's major projects, identifies factors that have contributed to this condition, and highlights challenges to NASA's management of the portfolio. To conduct this review, GAO assessed data on 18 current projects with an estimated life-cycle cost of over $250 million, including data on projects' cost, schedule, technology maturity, design stability, and contracts; analyzed monthly project status reports; and interviewed NASA and contractor officials. The performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has improved in the areas of cost and schedule growth since GAO's first assessment in 2009. Average development cost growth and schedule delay for the current portfolio have decreased to about a third of their 2009 levels. These figures exclude the cost and schedule growth of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA's most expensive science project, in part because of its disproportionate effect on the portfolio average. Including the JWST in the calculation would increase the 2013 portfolio's average development cost growth from 3.9 percent to 46.4 percent and would double the average launch delay, from 4 to 8 months and obscure the progress the rest of the portfolio has made toward maintaining cost and schedule baselines. Of the 12 projects in implementation, 9 reported no development cost growth and or launch schedule delay in the past year, but 2 of these are currently facing cost and/or schedule pressures. Three projects reported development cost growth or a launch delay, but for two projects the impetus was outside of the project's direct control. A number of factors appear to contribute to NASA's improved performance. For example, in prior reviews, a majority of projects exceeded their cost and schedule baselines. Most of these projects, however, have launched and are no longer affecting the portfolio. Consistent with prior recommendations, projects have also demonstrated some gains toward meeting best practices criteria for technology maturity and design stability. GAO has reported that conformity with these practices decreases cost and schedule risk. For example, 62 percent of the projects met technology maturity criteria this year as compared to 29 percent in 2010. Current projects also appear to be incorporating less technology risk, as the number of critical technologies per project has decreased from 4.7 in 2009 to 2.3 in 2013. NASA has also implemented new management practices that have likely contributed to improved performance, in part by increasing oversight. Continued leadership attention will be needed to ensure that good practices are maintained in the face of several challenges including: (1) managing competing priorities within the context of constrained budgets, (2) estimating costs associated with several large-scale projects, (3) improving overall cost and schedule estimation, and (4) using consistent and proven design stability metrics. GAO-13-276SP

The VA operates one of the nation's largest health care delivery systems. Charged with addressing the issues of increasing medical demands and aging medical facilities, VA currently manages the construction of 50 major medical-facility projects, each costing at least $10 million, some in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As requested, GAO examined VA's management of such projects. GAO reviewed (1) changes to costs, schedule, and scope for selected new medical-facility construction projects and (2) actions VA has taken to improve management and any opportunities that exist for VA to improve its management of costs, schedule, and scope of these construction projects. GAO analyzed documents, VA data as of November 2012 on selected major construction projects, and interviewed VA officials, architecture and engineering, and construction firms. Costs substantially increased and schedules were delayed for Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) largest medical-center construction projects in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida. As of November 2012, the cost increases for these projects ranged from 59 percent to 144 percent, with a total cost increase of nearly $1.5 billion and an average increase of approximately $366 million. The delays for these projects range from 14 to 74 months, resulting in an average delay of 35 months per project. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA contends that using the initial completion date from the construction contract would be more accurate than using the initial completion date provided to Congress; however, using this date would not account for how VA managed these projects prior to the award of the construction contract. Several factors, including changes to veterans' health care needs and site-acquisition issues contributed to increased costs and schedule delays at these sites. Although VA has taken some actions to address problems managing major construction projects, the agency has opportunities for further improvement. Construction management challenges remain, and opportunities exist for VA to avoid further cost increases and schedule delays. Given the complexity and speed of medical advances, many health care organizations have enlisted the services of experts in planning the procurement and installation of medical equipment for new medical centers. VA has used these planners at various phases for some projects and is reviewing its overall procurement of medical equipment. However, VA has not taken full advantage of medical equipment planners on all projects, in part because there is no guidance for doing so. Not using a medical equipment planner can lead to increased design and construction changes resulting in cost increases and schedule delays. VA has not yet clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA construction management staff, even though the agency previously identified the need to do so. GAO found that conflicting direction from VA to contractors can cause some confusion and lead to cost increases and construction delays. For example, contractor officials at one site said that VA's project manager directed them to defer the design of specific rooms until medical equipment was selected for the facility; however, VA's central office then directed the contractor to proceed with designing the rooms. This conflicting direction from VA will require the contractor to redesign the space, further expending project resources. The federal government's regulations and VA's policy specify that changes to construction contracts, known as change orders, should be issued in a timely manner; however, VA's change-order approval process requires time-consuming reviews at multiple organizational levels that have resulted in extensive delays and increased costs for some projects. VA is reviewing options to shorten the decision cycle for approval of construction contract modifications but has not yet streamlined the process. GAO-13-302

VA provided nearly $10 billion in education benefits to almost 1 million veterans and beneficiaries in fiscal year 2011. The majority of these benefits were provided through the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which in 2008 established what has since grown into VA's largest education program. This report examines: (1) what challenges, if any, veterans face pursuing higher education; (2) how VA supports student veterans on campus; and (3) to what extent veterans are achieving successful academic outcomes and how VA uses data on student outcomes to improve its education benefit programs. To address these topics, GAO reviewed existing government studies and scholarly research on veterans' educational challenges, services, and outcomes; reviewed VA's strategic planning documents; interviewed officials from VA, Education, higher education associations, and veteran service organizations; and conducted focus groups with student veterans and interviewed school officials at 11 postsecondary institutions. Student veterans face many challenges pursuing higher education, and problems with the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill create financial challenges that also affect veterans' academic success. Veterans already cope with challenges transitioning into college as nontraditional students (older or with family obligations) while they are readjusting to civilian life and potentially managing disabilities. However, veterans and school officials told GAO that delays in VA benefit payments create financial challenges for veterans that threaten their ability to pursue higher education. These delays led many veterans GAO spoke with to take on personal debt to cover their housing expenses or consider dropping out of school. VA has taken steps to reduce processing delays, and GAO previously made recommendations to address these issues. However, VA provides limited information about benefit processing timelines and payment policies to student veterans prior to enrollment, which can leave them unprepared to deal with these payment delays. In some cases, these delays also made it difficult for veterans to access other sources of federal grants and loans since some schools are reluctant to distribute this aid to students until after tuition and fee payments are received from VA. VA provides limited direct support to veterans on campus, and schools are generally building their own veteran support services without any assistance from VA. VA has initiated the VetSuccess on Campus pilot, which provides veterans on 32 campuses with direct access to VA counselors who help them connect to services. VA also offers counseling and funding for academic tutoring to eligible student veterans. The Post-9/11 GI Bill has also sparked rapid growth in student veteran enrollments, and schools have reported concerns about the challenges of supporting this emerging population. VA recognizes the need to leverage partnerships with stakeholders to better support veterans, but has not sought opportunities to disseminate information about best practices for supporting veterans that would help schools more effectively build their own on campus services. It is unclear the extent to which veterans are achieving successful academic outcomes, and VA lacks a plan for using student outcomes data from its new data collection efforts to improve its education programs. Current data on student veteran outcomes are outdated or incomplete. VA is coordinating with Education and the Department of Defense to develop additional outcome measures and has multiple efforts to collect new data on student veterans, including a study that will track Post-9/11 GI Bill beneficiaries over the next 20 years. However, VA does not yet have a plan to use these data to improve program management. These data could provide VA with a tool for assessing the effectiveness of its education benefit programs in facilitating student veterans' academic success. GAO-13-338

While VA treats the majority of veterans in VA-operated facilities, in some instances it must obtain the services of non-VA providers to ensure that veterans are provided timely and accessible care. These non-VA providers are commonly reimbursed by VA using a fee-for-service arrangement known as fee basis care. VA's fee basis care program has grown rapidly in recent years-rising from about 8 percent of VA's total health care services budget in fiscal year 2005 to about 11 percent in fiscal year 2012. GAO was asked to review fee basis care program spending and utilization and factors that influence VAMC fee basis utilization. This report examines how fee basis care spending and utilization changed from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, factors that contribute to the use of fee basis care, and VA's oversight of fee basis care program spending and utilization. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations, VA policies, and fee basis spending and utilization data from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012. In addition, GAO reviewed the fee basis care operations of six selected VAMCs that varied in size, services offered, and geographic location. The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) fee basis care spending increased from about $3.04 billion in fiscal year 2008 to about $4.48 billion in fiscal year 2012. The slight decrease in fiscal year 2012 spending from the fiscal year 2011 level was due to VA's adoption of Medicare rates as its primary payment method for fee basis providers. VA's fee basis care utilization also increased from about 821,000 veterans in fiscal year 2008 to about 976,000 veterans in fiscal year 2012. GAO found that several factors affect VA medical centers' (VAMC) utilization of fee basis care-including veteran travel distances to VAMCs and goals for the maximum amount of time veterans should wait for VAMC-based appointments. VAMCs that GAO reviewed reported that they often use fee basis care to provide veterans with treatment closer to their homes-particularly for veterans who are not eligible for travel reimbursement. In addition, VAMC officials reported that veterans are often referred to fee basis providers to ensure that VAMC-based clinics that would otherwise treat them can meet established VA wait time goals for how long veterans wait for an appointment. However, GAO found that VA has not established goals for and does not track how long veterans wait to be seen by fee basis providers. VA's monitoring of fee basis care spending is limited because fee basis data do not currently include a claim number or other identifier that allows all charges from a single office visit with a fee basis provider or an inpatient hospital stay to be analyzed together. GAO found that without the ability to analyze spending in this way, VA is limited in its ability to assess the cost of fee basis care and verify that fee basis providers were paid appropriately. GAO-13-441

The IL "track"-one of five tracks within VA's VR&E program-provides a range of benefits to help veterans with service-connected disabilities live independently when employment is not considered feasible at the time they enter the VR&E program. These benefits can include counseling, assistive devices, and other services or equipment. GAO was asked to review issues related to the IL track. This report examines (1) the characteristics of veterans in the IL track, and the types and costs of benefits they were provided; (2) the extent to which their IL plans were completed, and the time it took to complete them; and (3) the extent to which the IL track has been administered appropriately and consistently across regional offices. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed VA administrative data from fiscal years 2008 to 2011, and reviewed a random, generalizable sample of 182 veterans who entered the IL track in fiscal year 2008. In addition, GAO visited five VA regional offices; interviewed agency officials and staff; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency policies and procedures. Of the 9,215 veterans who entered the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Independent Living (IL) track within the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program in fiscal years 2008 to 2011, most were male Vietnam era veterans in their 50s or 60s. Almost 60 percent served in the U.S. Army, and fewer than 1 percent served in the National Guard or Reserve. The most prevalent disabilities among these veterans were post-traumatic stress disorder and tinnitus. GAO's review of 182 IL cases from fiscal year 2008 found that VR&E provided a range of IL benefits to veterans. Among these cases, the most common benefits were counseling services and computers. Less common benefits included gym memberships, camping equipment, and a boat. GAO estimated that VR&E spent nearly $14 million on benefits for veterans entering the IL track in fiscal year 2008-an average of almost $6,000 per IL veteran. Most veterans completed their IL plans, which identify their individual goals to live independently and the benefits VR&E will provide. About 89 percent of fiscal year 2008 IL veterans were considered by VR&E to be "rehabilitated," that is, generally, to have completed their IL plans by the end of fiscal year 2011. VR&E discontinued or closed about 5 percent of cases for various reasons, such as the veteran declined benefits. Six percent of cases were open at the end of fiscal year 2011. Because the complexity of IL cases varied depending on veterans' disabilities and needs, some cases were fairly simple for VR&E to close. For example, one IL case only called for the installation of door levers and a bathtub rail. Another more complex case involved the provision of a range of IL benefits, including home modifications. Rehabilitation rates across regions varied from 0 to 100 percent, and regions with larger IL caseloads generally rehabilitated a greater percentage of IL veterans. While IL plans nationwide were completed in 384 days, on average, completion times varied by region, from 150 to 895 days. VR&E exercises limited oversight to ensure appropriate and consistent administration of the IL track across its regions. While the law currently allows 2,700 veterans to enter the IL track annually, data used to monitor the cap are based on the number of IL plans developed, not on the number of individual veterans admitted. Veterans can have more than one plan in a fiscal year, so one veteran could be counted multiple times towards the cap. GAO-13-474

VHA's logistics program is responsible for the management of medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs' inventories and the standardization of such items throughout VHA. Previous reports have pointed to deficiencies in VHA's logistics program. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which VAMCs and networks have complied with new VHA requirements to remedy known deficiencies in its logistics program and (2) VHA's progress in enhancing its logistics program. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials to identify new requirements affecting VHA's logistics program. GAO then visited a nongeneralizable sample of five VAMCs and verified the extent to which the VAMCs and corresponding networks, which oversee VAMCs, were complying with VHA's new requirements. GAO also reviewed documentation of VHA's plans for funding, implementing, and evaluating efforts it is undertaking to enhance its logistics program, examined the extent to which VHA was on track to execute those plans, and assessed VHA's efforts against criteria in GAO's standards for internal control in the federal government. To address deficiencies in its logistics program, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) issued new requirements in 2011 regarding the management of medical supplies and equipment in Veterans Affairs medical centers' (VAMC) inventories, the standardization of these items, and the monitoring of VAMCs' logistics programs. These requirements, some of which apply to VAMCs and some of which apply to networks, are designed to improve veterans' safety and the cost-effective use of resources. GAO found that the five VAMCs GAO visited and their corresponding networks have partially complied with VHA's new requirements. Specifically, as of December 2012, none of the VAMCs GAO visited fully complied with all of VHA's new requirements for managing inventories; one VAMC GAO visited and two networks fully complied with VHA's new standardization requirements, and the remaining four VAMCs and three networks partially complied; and four of the five VAMCs GAO visited and three of the five corresponding networks fully complied with the new monitoring requirements. Because VAMCs GAO visited and the associated networks have only partially complied with these requirements, potential risks to patient safety and the inefficient use of resources remain. In addition to the new VAMC and network requirements, VHA has other efforts underway that-according to officials-will further improve the management and tracking of medical supplies and equipment in VAMC inventories and the standardization of such items across VHA. However, there are substantive uncertainties relating to implementation, funding, and operational issues that may impede their success, if not appropriately addressed. Specifically: VHA is piloting a new inventory management system that is intended to replace VHA's existing systems for managing medical supply and equipment inventories. However, VHA has not fully funded the pilot, staffing resources to implement it at VAMCs are limited, and VHA has yet to resolve technical issues to ensure that this new system can interface with legacy systems. Furthermore, VHA has yet to develop criteria and collect corresponding data to evaluate the performance of the pilot. VHA is also implementing a system for electronically tracking the location of certain medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs. However, there are uncertainties with respect to interoperability issues with other inventory management systems and resources to implement the system. Lastly, VHA is establishing a program executive office that will provide logistics support and manage the standardization of medical supplies and equipment VHA-wide. However, the office has not been fully staffed and uncertainty exists about its continued implementation, because VHA's efforts to hire additional staff are on hold pending its evaluation of the effectiveness of this office. GAO-13-336

Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights annually. The Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO reviewed TSAs progress in meeting the acts screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). GAO reviewed TSAs policies and procedures, interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size, among other factors.

"Explosives represent a continuing threat to aviation security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), seeks to ensure through the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) that checked-baggage-screening technology is capable of detecting explosives. Generally, the explosives detection system (EDS) is used in conjunction with explosives trace detection (ETD) machines to identify and resolve threats in checked baggage. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which: (1) TSA revised explosives detection requirements and deployed technology to meet those requirements, and (2) TSA's approach to the current EDS acquisition meets best practices for schedules and cost estimates and includes plans for potential upgrades of deployed EDSs. GAO analyzed EDS requirements, compared the EDS acquisition schedule against GAO best practices, and interviewed DHS officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2011. "

The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for their uniform development and they varied in their usage of that guidance. As a result, the services had fragmented procedures for managing their uniform development programs, and did not consistently develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO identified two key elements that are essential for producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: 1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make decisions, such as credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine Corps followed these two key elements to produce a successful outcome, and developed a uniform that met its requirements. By contrast, two other services, the Army and Air Force, did not follow the two key elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet mission requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined approach to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet operational needs. The military services' fragmented approach for acquiring uniforms has not ensured the development of joint criteria for new uniforms or achieved cost efficiency. DOD has not met a statutory requirement to establish joint criteria for future uniforms or taken steps to ensure that uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for service members, and the services have not pursued opportunities to seek to reduce clothing costs, such as by collaborating on uniform inventory costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the military departments to establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms. The departments asked the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to develop the joint criteria, but the task is incomplete. If the services do not use joint criteria to guide their activities, one or more service may develop uniforms without certainty that the uniforms include the newest technology, advanced materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of performance. Further, DOD does not have a means to ensure that the services meet statutory policy permitting the development of service-unique uniforms as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, provide service members the equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to individuals operating in the joint battle space. Without a policy to ensure that services develop and field uniforms with equivalent performance and protection, the services could fall short of protecting all service members equally, potentially exposing a number to unnecessary risks. Finally, the services may have opportunities for partnerships to reduce inventory costs for new uniforms. The Army may be able to save about $82 million if it can partner with another service. Under DOD guidance, the services are encouraged to actively seek to reduce costs. The Air Force has shown interest in the Army's current uniform development, but none of the services has agreed to partner with the Army on a new uniform. In the absence of a DOD requirement that the services collaborate to standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, the services may forego millions of dollars in potential cost savings. GAO recommends that DOD take four actions to improve the development of camouflage uniforms and enhance collaboration among the services: ensure that the services have and use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, establish joint criteria, develop policy to ensure equivalent protection levels, and pursue partnerships where applicable to help reduce costs. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified planned actions.

GAO identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or had been initiated since 2007, and the Department of Defense (DOD) had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. None of the civil agency efforts met GAO's criteria for a key effort. Most of the aerostat and airship efforts have been fielded or completed, and are intended to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. The estimated total funding of these efforts was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However, funding estimates beyond fiscal year 2012 decline precipitously for aerostat and airship efforts under development, although there is an expectation that investment in the area will continue. Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical challenges, such as overweight components, and difficulties with integration and software development, which, in turn, have driven up costs and delayed schedules. DOD has provided limited oversight to ensure coordination of its aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the time of GAO's review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. Additionally, DOD's coordination efforts have been limited to specific technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. DOD has recently taken steps to bolster oversight, including the appointment of a senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of airship-related programs. However, as of August 2012, DOD has not defined the details relating to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. Whether these steps are sufficient largely depends on the direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If it decides to continue investing in efforts, more steps may be needed to shape these investments.

" For the past 3 years, DOD has been implementing the Reform Act requirements which are aimed at helping weapon acquisition programs establish a solid foundation from the start. This helps to prevent cost growth, thus helping the Defense dollar go further. This is the third in a series of GAO reports on the Reform Act. GAO was asked to determine (1) DOD's progress in implementing Reform Act provisions; (2) the impact the Reform Act has had on specific acquisition programs; and (3) challenges remaining. To do this, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from the four OSD offices created as a result of the Reform Act, other DOD offices, the military services, and 11 weapon acquisition programs we chose as case studies. Case study programs were selected based on their development status and interaction with the four OSD offices. Results cannot be generalized to all DOD weapon acquisition programs. "

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Defense (DOD) do not require that all collaboration sites--locations where the two departments share health care resources through hundreds of agreements and projects--develop and use performance measures to assess their effectiveness and efficiency. Officials cited several reasons for this, including not wanting to overburden sites with measures and monitoring requirements. Although VA and DOD require some limited performance information--such as the return on investment for pilot projects--without comprehensive performance measures, they lack information that could help decision makers assess collaboration sites' overall progress in meeting the departments' shared goals of improved health care access, quality, and costs; identify areas for improvement; and make informed decisions. Also, the departments cannot document the overall cost effectiveness of their collaboration efforts. In the absence of required measures for all sites, some have developed their own, but these fragmented efforts do not provide sufficient information about the overall results of collaborations. The departments face a number of key barriers that hinder collaboration efforts. In particular, GAO identified incompatible policies and practices in four areas: Information technology (IT) systems. Because VA and DOD collect, store, and process health information in different IT systems, providing access to information needed to best treat patients has proved problematic. Business and administrative processes. Different billing practices, difficulties capturing patient workload information, and overlapping efforts in credentialing providers and computer security training reduce efficiency. Access to military bases. Balancing base security needs with veterans' needs to access medical facilities on base creates some difficulties. Medical facility construction. Misaligned construction planning processes hinder efforts to jointly plan facilities to serve both VA and DOD beneficiaries. Although VA and DOD officials have taken some steps to address these areas, such as efforts to improve data sharing, without additional department-level actions, barriers will continue to hinder collaboration and lead to inefficiencies. VA and DOD do not have a fully developed process for systematically identifying all opportunities for new or enhanced collaboration. Instead, the identification of those collaboration opportunities is largely left to local medical facility leadership. Although the departments have a process for jointly identifying a select number of sites with opportunities for new or expanded collaboration, that process does not address all opportunities for collaboration across both health care systems and there is no requirement that sites identified by that process move forward to implement collaboration. Without a fully developed process to systematically identify and select additional collaboration opportunities, the departments may miss opportunities to achieve their shared goals and reduce duplication of services, such as through additional sharing agreements.

As with conventional oil and gas development, requirements from eight federal environmental and public health laws apply to unconventional oil and gas development. For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulates discharges of pollutants into surface waters. Among other things, CWA requires oil and gas well site operators to obtain permits for discharges of produced water-which includes fluids used for hydraulic fracturing, as well as water that occurs naturally in oil- or gas-bearing formations-to surface waters. In addition, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) governs the management and disposal of hazardous wastes, among other things. However, key exemptions or limitations in regulatory coverage affect the applicability of six of these environmental and public health laws. For example, CWA also generally regulates stormwater discharges by requiring that facilities associated with industrial and construction activities get permits, but the law and its regulations largely exempt oil and gas well sites. In addition, oil and gas exploration and production wastes are exempt from RCRA hazardous waste requirements based on a regulatory determination made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1988. EPA generally retains its authorities under federal environmental and public health laws to respond to environmental contamination. All six states in GAO's review implement additional requirements governing activities associated with oil and gas development and have updated some aspects of their requirements in recent years. For example, all six states have requirements related to how wells are to be drilled and how casing-steel pipe within the well-is to be installed and cemented in place, though the specifics of their requirements vary. The states also have requirements related to well site selection and preparation, which may include baseline testing of water wells before drilling or stormwater management. Oil and gas development on federal lands must comply with applicable federal environmental and state laws, as well as additional requirements. These requirements are the same for conventional and unconventional oil and gas development. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees oil and gas development on approximately 700 million subsurface acres. BLM regulations for leases and permits govern similar types of activities as state requirements, such as requirements for how operators drill the well and install casing. BLM recently proposed new regulations for hydraulic fracturing of wells on public lands. Federal and state agencies reported several challenges in regulating oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs. EPA officials reported that conducting inspection and enforcement activities and having limited legal authorities are challenges. For example, conducting inspection and enforcement activities is challenging due to limited information, such as data on groundwater quality prior to drilling. EPA officials also said that the exclusion of exploration and production waste from hazardous waste regulations under RCRA significantly limits EPA's role in regulating these wastes. In addition, BLM and state officials reported that hiring and retaining staff and educating the public are challenges. For example, officials from several states and BLM said that retaining employees is difficult because qualified staff are frequently offered more money for private sector positions within the oil and gas industry.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to implement fundamental Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act) provisions, including those for approving acquisition strategies and better monitoring weapon acquisition programs. DOD is also continuing to take additional steps to strengthen policies and capabilities. Some provisions, such as issuing guidance for estimating operating and support costs, are being implemented. GAO's analysis of 11 weapon acquisition programs showed the Reform Act has reinforced early attention to requirements, cost and schedule estimates, testing, and reliability. For example, prior to starting development, an independent review team raised concerns about the Ground Combat Vehicle program's many requirements and the risks associated with its 7-year schedule. Subsequently, the Army reduced the number of requirements by about 25 percent and prioritized them, giving contractors more flexibility in designing solutions. In addition, the developmental test and evaluation office--resulting from the Reform Act--used test results to help the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program develop a more realistic reliability goal and a better approach to reach it. While DOD has taken steps to implement most of the fundamental Reform Act provisions, some key efforts to date have been primarily focused on DOD's largest weapon acquisition programs. DOD faces five challenges--organizational capability constraints, the need for additional guidance on cost estimating and Reform Act implementation, the uncertainty about the sufficiency of systems engineering and developmental testing resources, limited dissemination of lessons learned, and cultural barriers between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services--that limit its ability to broaden the Reform Act's influence to more programs. Service officials believe additional guidance is needed to improve their cost estimates and other implementation efforts. They also believe that lessons learned from programs that experience significant cost and schedule increases should be shared more broadly within the acquisition community. These challenges seem straightforward to address, but they may require more resources, which have been difficult to obtain. Ensuring the services have key leaders and staff dedicated to systems engineering and developmental testing activities, such as chief engineers at the service level and technical leads on programs, as well as breaking down cultural barriers are more difficult to address. They will require continued monitoring and attention by the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, service acquisition executives, and offices established as a result of the Reform Act to address.

Deficiencies exposed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 2007 served as a catalyst compelling the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) to address a host of problems for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and veterans as they navigate through the recovery care continuum. This continuum extends from acute medical treatment and stabilization, through rehabilitation to reintegration, either back to active duty or to the civilian community as a veteran. In spite of 5 years of departmental efforts, recovering servicemembers and veterans are still facing problems with this process and may not be getting the services they need. Key departmental efforts included the creation or modification of various care coordination and case management programs, including the military services' wounded warrior programs. However, these programs are not always accessible to those who need them due to the inconsistent methods, such as referrals, used to identify potentially eligible servicemembers, as well as inconsistent eligibility criteria across the military services' wounded warrior programs. The departments also jointly established an integrated disability evaluation system to expedite the delivery of benefits to servicemembers. However, processing times for disability determinations under the new system have increased since 2007, resulting in lengthy wait times that limit servicemembers' ability to plan for their future. Finally, despite years of incremental efforts, DOD and VA have yet to develop sufficient capabilities for electronically sharing complete health records, which potentially delays servicemembers' receipt of coordinated care and benefits as they transition from DOD's to VA's health care system. Collectively, a lack of leadership, oversight, resources, and collaboration has contributed to the departments' inability to fully resolve problems facing recovering servicemembers and veterans. Initially, departmental leadership exhibited focus and commitment to addressing problems related to case management and care coordination, disability evaluation systems, and data sharing between DOD and VA. However, the committee's oversight waned over time, and in January 2012, it was merged with the VA/DOD Joint Executive Council. Whether this council can effectively address the shorter-term policy focused issues once managed by the Senior Oversight Committee remains to be seen. Furthermore, DOD does not provide central oversight of the military services' wounded warrior programs, preventing it from determining how well these programs are working across the department. However, despite these shortcomings, the departments continue to take steps to resolve identified problems, such as increasing the number of staff involved with the electronic sharing of health records and the integrated disability evaluation process. While the departments' previous attempts to collaborate on how to resolve case management and care coordination problems have largely been unsuccessful, a joint task force established in May 2012 is focused on resolving long-standing areas of disagreement between VA, DOD, and the military services. However, without more robust oversight and military service compliance, consistent implementation of policies that result in more effective case management and care coordination programs may be unattainable. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD and VA to jointly develop and implement policy on the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. It also required GAO to report on DOD's and VA's progress in addressing these requirements. This report specifically examines (1) the extent to which DOD and VA have resolved persistent problems facing recovering servicemembers and veterans as they navigate the recovery care continuum, and (2) the reasons DOD and VA leadership have not been able to fully resolve any remaining problems.

"The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provided $9 billion in education benefits to service-members and veterans in fiscal year 2010, mostly through the new Post-9/11 GI Bill. In providing education benefits, VA relies on State Approving Agencies (SAA) to approve schools; and on schools to report students' enrollment status. GAO was asked to determine: (1) what is known about the effectiveness of outreach to and support for individuals applying for VA education benefits, particularly those with disabilities; (2) the role of school officials and challenges they face in their role; and (3) how VA monitors and oversees states' and schools' implementation of these benefits. GAO reviewed VA reports and plans, conducted a nationally representative survey of school officials, interviewed VA and state officials in four states, and reviewed recent statutory changes to the Post-9/11 GI Bill. "

" Security clearances allow personnel access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can, in some cases, cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2011, the DNI reported that over 4.8 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible for a clearance. To safeguard classified data and manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether civilian positions require a clearance. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the executive branch has established policies and procedures for agencies to use when (1) first determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance and (2) reviewing and revising or validating existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements. GAO reviewed executive orders and the Code of Federal Regulations and met with officials from ODNI and OPM because of their Directors' assigned roles as Security and Suitability executive agents, as well as DHS and DOD based on the volume of clearances they process. "

"Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult-if not impossible-for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration. "

" Tribal firms-those owned by Alaska Native Corporations, Native Hawaiian Organizations, and Indian tribes-are afforded special advantages within the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) business development program. GAO was asked to (1) identify trends in government 8(a) contracting with tribal firms; (2) determine why the government awarded sole-source contracts to tribal 8(a) firms and the methods used to make price determinations; (3) assess the procuring agencies' oversight of contracts for compliance with subcontracting requirements; and (4) examine SBA's new 8(a) regulation, intended to clarify program rules, to determine how the changes could affect oversight of tribal 8(a) firms. GAO reviewed non-generalizable samples of 87 contracts (based on dollar value and location) and 62 tribal 8(a) firms' SBA files and spoke with SBA headquarters and district officials as well as officials from 9 agencies. "

" The federal government faces a long-term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. To put the government on a more sustainable long-term path, policymakers will need to have a broad fiscal plan that considers reducing spending, increasing revenue, or more likely, a combination of the two. While addressing this structural imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term, opportunities exist to act in a number of areas to improve this situation. This statement highlights several areas in which the federal government is facing government-wide management challenges and the opportunities to act: improper payments; IT acquisitions, operations, and cybersecurity; and federal real property. This statement draws from GAO's 2017 High-Risk List, the 2017 annual report on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, and other related work. Properly managing government resources can help address the federal government's fiscal challenges by preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and ensuring funds are put to the best possible use. Although these actions alone cannot put the U.S. government on a sustainable fiscal path, they would improve both the fiscal situation and the federal government's operations"

"On April 20, 2010, an explosion at the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon resulted in a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The spill's total cost is unknown, but may result in considerable costs to the private sector, as well as federal, state, and local governments. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) set up a system that places the liability-up to specified limits-on the responsible party. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), administered by the Coast Guard, pays for costs not paid for by the responsible party. GAO previously reported on the Fund and factors driving the cost of oil spills and is beginning work on the April 2010 spill. This testimony focuses on (1) how oil spills are paid for, (2) the factors that affect major oil spill costs, and (3) implications of major oil spill costs for the Fund. It is largely based on GAO's 2007 report, for which GAO analyzed oil spill cost data and reviewed documentation on the Fund's balance and vessels' limits of liability. To update the report, GAO obtained information from and interviewed Coast Guard officials. "

" DOD has stated that it intends to rebalance its defense posture toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts the largest U.S. forward-operating presence in this region; the majority of the U.S. forces in Japan are located in Okinawa. The United States and Japan planned to reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by relocating approximately 9,000 Marines. DOD had originally planned to move the Marines only to Guam, but revised its plans in 2012 to include other locations in the Pacific. Congressional committees have directed GAO to examine DOD's initiatives in the Pacific, focusing on planning and costs. This report discusses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive cost estimate for the realignment of Marines, (2) planned for and synchronized other movements to coincide with the realignment, and (3) identified plans to sustain the force until all initiatives are implemented. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant policies and procedures, reviewed and analyzed cost documents related to the realignment initiatives, interviewed DOD officials, and conducted site visits at U.S. military installations in the Pacific. "

"Navy's four public shipyards-Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard-are critical in maintaining fleet readiness and supporting ongoing operations worldwide. The Navy requests funds for the shipyards' restoration and modernization as infrastructure condition may affect their mission and workforce. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which the shipyards have plans for their restoration and modernization needs; (2) the extent to which the Navy has a process to capture and calculate these needs; (3) the Navy's process to prioritize and fund projects to meet these needs; and (4) the extent to which the shipyards resolve infrastructure-related safety, health, and quality-of-life issues. GAO assessed the Navy's shipyard plans against elements of a federal strategic planning framework; evaluated its process for determining its restoration and modernization needs and addressing safety, health, and quality-of-life issues; visited the shipyards; and interviewed Navy command and shipyard officials. GAO recommends that the Navy develop guidance to standardize shipyard strategic planning requirements, improve its process for developing shipyard restoration"

The terrorist group AQAP, one of the top threats to U.S. national security, is based in Yemen-a country facing serious economic and social challenges and undergoing a difficult political transition following civil unrest in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and USAID have allocated over $1 billion in assistance to help Yemen counter AQAP and address other challenges. The three largest U.S. assistance programs in Yemen are USAID's Food for Peace program, which has provided emergency food aid, and DOD's Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni security forces. In response to a Senate report that directed GAO to review U.S. assistance to Yemen, and following up on GAO's February 2012 report on the types and amounts of such assistance, GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners in Washington, D.C., and Sana'a, Yemen. Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals. Although some progress has been made since the civil unrest in 2011, obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For example, while there has been an orderly political transition to a new president, key milestones-such as convening a national dialogue to promote reconciliation-have been delayed. In addition, while Yemeni security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains unstable. USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of its annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With regard to the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an evaluation process to assess the programs' effectiveness but has not conducted an evaluation in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding decisions. Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. First, Yemen's unstable security situation constrains U.S. training of Yemeni security forces, restricts oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangers Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For example, a Yemeni employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 2012, and other Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face threats. Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemen's security. However, according to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government to replace key leaders of security force units and reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges. GAO-13-310

" Dietary supplements, such as vitamins and botanical products, are a multibillion dollar industry; national data show that over half of all U.S. adults consume them. FDA regulates dietary supplements and generally relies on postmarket surveillance, such as monitoring AERs, to identify potential concerns. Since December 2007, firms receiving a serious AER have had to report on it to FDA within 15 days. In January 2009, GAO reported that FDA had taken several steps to implement AER requirements and had recommended actions to help FDA identify and act on safety concerns for dietary supplements. GAO was asked to examine FDA's use of AERs in overseeing dietary supplements. This report examines the (1) number of AERs FDA has received since 2008, their source, and types of products identified; (2) actions FDA has taken to ensure that firms are complying with AER requirements; (3) extent to which FDA is using AERs to initiate and support its consumer protection efforts; and (4) extent to which FDA has implemented GAO's 2009 recommendations. GAO analyzed FDA data, reviewed FDA guidance, and interviewed FDA officials. "

" In March 2013, DOD's discretionary budget was reduced by $37 billion as a result of sequestration-across-the-board spending reductions to enforce certain budget policy goals. In response, the Secretary of Defense implemented an administrative furlough, among other things by placing most of DOD's civilian personnel in a temporary nonduty, nonpay status. An administrative furlough is a planned event by an agency to absorb reductions due to budget situations other than a lapse in appropriations. GAO was mandated to review DOD's implementation of its administrative furlough. This report (1) examined how DOD implemented its furloughs and any reported cost savings, (2) examined the extent to which DOD utilized up-to-date cost-savings information in the planning and implementation of furloughs, and (3) identified any reported examples of impacts that resulted from the furloughs. GAO reviewed DOD furlough guidance, interviewed officials, and conducted visits at selected sites that were selected to represent different categories of furlough exceptions and potential sequestration impacts, among other things. "