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During World War II, the American and British intercepted and read hundreds of thousands of their enemies¿ secret military and diplomatic message transmitted by radio. ULTRA was the designation for the signals intelligence derived from German radio communications encrypted by the ENIGMA cipher machine. At the British Government Code and CipherSchool at BletchleyPark, British and American military personnel, including a young officer named Lewis F. Powell, were indoctrinated in ULTRA intelligence. In "ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview with Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr.", Justice Powell describes in detail his experiences at Bletchley Park and subsequent role in evaluating the use of ULTRA intelligence by the Air Force in the European Theater through the medium of an oral history interview with two U.S. Air Force historians. During his stay at Bletchley Park, Powell met the key figures in the ULTRA effort, including Alan Turing, about whom he says, ¿The word ¿brilliant¿ fails to reflect his genius.¿ Powell also talks about who among the Allied powers had access to ULTRA data, confirming that the USSR was never given access and that, due to British suspicions of certain individuals, the French received only limited information, even after D-Day. Powell also addresses such topics as the bombing of Dresden and Allied knowledge of such German weapons as the V-1, V-2, and ME-262. Included in an appendix are transcriptions of Powell¿s notes taken at Bletchley Park. His interview is supplemented by an informative essay, ¿The U.S. Military Intelligence Service: The ULTRA Mission,¿ by Air Force historian Diane T. Putney. ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II is a remarkable firsthand account of the most extraordinary intelligence coup of World War II, told by an intelligent, observant, and articulate military participant. As such, it constitutes an important contribution to the history of the intelligence war that should be of interest to historians and intelligence professionals alike.

Originally published in 1977. Smithsonian Institution Annals of Flight series.

1992 manual from the United States Marine Corps.One of the great recurring failures in modern European warfare has been unpreparedness for winter warfare. Men, horses, and machine all have special needs if they are to operate effectively in conditions of cold, snow, and ice yet, particularly after the heyday of the warrior kings of Sweden, army commanders and political leaders seemed gradually to abandon the idea that a specific type of war needs to be waged. Napoleon, World War I generals, Stalin, and Hitler all paid a grim price for this strategic amnesia. In "On Winter Warfare", the U.S. Marine Corps Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory provides both a brief history of war in winter and an analysis of the art of warfare in cold climates. It makes the key point that, rather than the Russian winter defeating Napoleon, it was his generally ill-conceived campaign, probably generated by a series of successes under predictable conditions. Similarly, Hitler¿s overweening reliance on his own will and intuition simply brushed aside the practical difficulties of a winter campaign in Russia under the assumption that the initial German assault would cause a total collapse of Russian resistance. When this failed to occur, the Wehrmacht¿s lack of preparedness for a winter campaign rapidly became manifest. In dealing with the general principles of cold weather war, "On Winter Warfare" highlights the importance of wintertime obstacle construction, the many variables presented by the military properties of snow ¿ including grain size, density, hardness, crusts, and temperature ¿ and the technical problems surrounding cold weather ballistics. It also provides an in-depth discussion of the key strategic principles in winter war ¿ mobility, initiative, flexibility, superiority, and surprise ¿ and the requirements that must be met to achieve them. Military professionals, historians of modern warfare, and anyone interested in the uniquely stressful conditions of cold weather war will find this book both a key reference work and compelling reading.

In the short history of air warfare, no nation with superior air forces has ever lost a war to the force of enemy arms. In itself, however, air superiority no longer guarantees victory. Planning the aerial dimension of war must of necessity explore the complicated connection between air superiority and triumph in war. "The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat" focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. It draws on fascinating historical examples from World War II and the Arab-Israeli wars, stressing that the mastery of operational strategy is key to victory. It stresses the importance of using air power more effectively ¿ through mass, concentration, and economy of forces ¿ because superiority in manpower, production capacity, and technology can no longer be assumed, even by a superpower. Topics covered include: Offensive and defensive operations; Air interdiction; Close air support; Reserves; Orchestration of war; Planning the air campaign. This book offers planners a greater understanding of how to use air power for future campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. It confirms that the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. Air officers who want to think about air campaigns before being called upon to command or staff one, combat officers of any service involved in operations-level staff activities, and serious students of the theory and practice of air warfare will find "The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat" an invaluable resource.

** This official edition contains more than 100 pages of dissenting views not printed in the commercial version ** In the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, President Obama signed into law an Act that established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States. This bipartisan Commission was given a critical non-partisan mission - to examine the causes of the financial crisis that has gripped the country and to report its findings to the Congress, the President, and the American people.In the course of its research and investigation, the Commission reviewed millions of pages of documents, interviewed more than 700 witnesses, and held 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the country that were hit hard by the crisis. Its final report includes the results of the Commission's inquiry and the Commission's conclusions as to the causes of the financial crisis based on this inquiry.