Bøger udgivet af ISEAS

A few ASEAN countries have signed the Global Methane Pledge, but methane should receive a broader and higher priority from the entire region, given its significant contribution to climate change, and the availability of solutions. The agriculture sector contributes the most amount of methane emissions with a steadily rising share over the past decade. Several Southeast Asian countries face similar methane abatement challenges (i.e., agricultural productivity in Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines; gas leakage in Malaysia and Brunei; and waste management in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), warranting closer collaboration at the subregional level. While it is true that countries have been participating in international initiatives and implementing national policies related to rice cultivation and oil and gas processing, their impacts have not been thoroughly evaluated. Rather than creating new institutional structures, ASEAN could for example ensure that its existing working groups and networks prioritize methane abatement. Missing data on the relative contribution to methane emissions from livestock, rice paddies and informal economies should be collected to help refine problem definition and formulate effective solutions.

In 1992, a group of academics at the National University of Malaysia (UKM) organized a seminar titled "Seminar Ahli Sunnah dan Syiah Imamiyyah" ("Seminar on Ahl al-Sunnah and Imami Shi'ism") in Kuala Lumpur. It aimed to demonize Shi'a Muslims and ban Shi'ism, effectively escalating sectarianism in Muslim society. A Deobandi presenter at the seminar by the name of Muhammad Asri Yusoff put forth arguments about Shi'ism, which later became the "intellectual base" for the discrimination and repression of Shi'a Muslims by Islamic authorities in Malaysia. This repression continues till the present day, and other religious leaders--particularly those with a Salafi orientation--take part in this. While much attention has been given to those who have escalated sectarianism, there have also been efforts to de-escalate sectarianism. These efforts come from groups such as Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, and individuals such as Abdul Hadi Awang of PAS, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the leader of International Movement for a Just World, Chandra Muzaffar, as well as Malaysian academic, Syed Farid Alatas. Nevertheless, the roots of sectarianism have been deeply laid since the seminar in 1992. Unsurprisingly, the sectarian campaign against Shi'as is aligned with the agenda of extremist and terrorist organizations such as ISIS. The sectarian campaign thus arguably emboldens such groups and puts Malaysia and the entire Southeast Asia at risk.

In the first half of 2021, COVID-19 vaccine doses from the COVAX Facility were in short supply, and the plan to mass produce COVAX vaccines through the Serum Institute of India (SII) faltered as the pandemic surged in India in March 2021. Due to COVAX's shift in approach towards convincing richer nations to redistribute their excess doses, the second half of 2021 saw increases in the frequency and volume of its shipments. Donors were however able to "earmark" their dose donations and identify their intended recipients. The six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots--Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam (the AMC6)--received 16 million doses in the first half of 2021. In the second half, they received 128 million doses from COVAX, 80.9 per cent of which were earmarked donations. Despite making up 7 per cent of the world population, the AMC6 collectively accounted for 24.3 per cent of all earmarked dose donations (and 25 per cent of the United States' total dose donations) to COVAX in 2021. The AMC6 greatly benefitted from COVAX's pivot to dose donations. This demonstrated the region's strategic salience to Washington and its allies, but came at the expense of vaccine equity, which the region has prudential reasons to care about. The execution of COVAX hammers home the hard truth that multilateral governance is a difficult act to pull off even with the best intentions and is not impervious to the geopolitical interests and agendas of the major powers.

Peranakan Chinese communities and their "hybrid" culture have fascinated many observers. This book, comprising fourteen chapters, was mainly based on papers written by the author in the last two decades. The chapters address Peranakan Chinese cultural, national and political identities in the Malay Archipelago, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (IMS). This book is divided into two parts. Part I which is on the regional dimension, contains nine chapters that discuss the three countries and beyond. Part II consists of five chapters which focus on one country, i.e., Indonesia. This book not only discusses the past and the present, but also the future of the Peranakan Chinese.

Updated by popular demand, this is the fourth edition of this important bibliography. It lists a wide selection of works on or about Myanmar published in English and in hard copy since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, which marked the beginning of a new era in Myanmar's modern history. There are now 2,727 titles listed.

Examines Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. The book not only details Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Indonesia's neighbours and major powers, but also places it in the context of foreign policy analysis.

By studying intersections among new cults of wealth, ritually empowered amulets and professional spirit mediumship - which have emerged together in Thailand's dynamic religious field in recent decades - Capitalism Magic Thailand explores the conditions under which global modernity produces new varieties of enchantment.

This report presents findings from a nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,627 Malaysians between March and April 2021 regarding public perceptions on the Election Commission (EC) and on election management. Malaysians by and large hold a cautious, moderate affirmation of the state of democracy in Malaysia, and of it having made notable progress over the past decade. A quarter of respondents regard the 2018 general election to be very free or/and fair, while 43 per cent think that it was free/fair though not without problems. This perception appears to have been influenced by the fact that there was a change of federal government. Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the election management process and the EC is weakly affirmative, as revealed by a majority expressing a lack of confidence in an eventual online voting system being handled transparently. Urban residents generally have greater distrust in state institutions. Some notable contrasts in regional trends: -- Sarawakians have a high level of trust in state institutions.-- Sabahans have the lowest appreciation for the progress made in the state of democracy in the country, the lowest satisfaction with civil liberty, or the lowest trust in state institutions except for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the EC. -- West Malaysians have the lowest level of trust in the MACC and EC but express the highest level of appreciation for the progress that have made in the state of democracy.

On 28 April 2021, the Indonesian government, under President Joko Widodo, dissolved the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Kemenristek-Dikti). Since then, the management of higher education has been taken over by the Ministry of Education and Culture, while research and innovation are now the responsibility of the National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, or BRIN). Based on Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Nos. 33 and 78 of 2021, various research institutes, such as LIPI, BATAN, LAPAN and BPPT, and research agencies in some ministries have been or will be merged into BRIN, making it a "super-government agency" with an "overarching" role. With a Rp26 trillion budget allocated by the government for research per year and with a large number of researchers, BRIN is expected to boost national research and innovation, and help the country catch up with countries such as Singapore and South Korea. BRIN, however, faces some serious challenges. It is not related to budget, infrastructure or human resources, but to the research ecosystem and research culture of Indonesia. Technocratism, which has been restricting research in the country, will be its first challenge. Politicization of research institutions as indicated by the involvement of political parties in research supervision is another issue. Achieving an environment that makes good and healthy research possible built around an effective system of funding, academic rewards, and a vibrant academic community, will be the third challenge. If BRIN manages to overcome these challenges sufficiently, it will be in a good position to enhance the capacity and competence of Indonesian researchers as the foundation for an advanced Indonesia by 2045.

Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure. Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party's establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang. The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election. Dr Boo Cheng Hau inherited the decentralized state leadership structure when he became the DAP Johor chairman in 2005. Under Dr Boo's leadership the party prioritized welfare provision and constituency services in several state constituencies, particularly Skudai (in Gelang Patah) and Bentayan (in Bakri).

Provides up-to-date overviews of inequality levels and trends, primarily related to income, but also wealth and other socio-economic variables pertaining to education and health. The country chapters also examine salient themes of inequality, especially structural changes and public policies to redress inequality and exclusion.

The concept of the Islamization of knowledge was introduced by Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas in the late 1970s. It aimed to detach knowledge from Western culture and civilization in order to replace it with Islamic concepts, frameworks and values.

The unrealized transitions were a setback for a 'reform agenda', which Anwar Ibrahim articulated, but which emerged from dissident movements for diverse reforms. These movements helped the multiethnic, socially inclusive, opposition to win the 14th General Election. They are only seemingly dormant because of the pandemic.

Explores three issues: what have been the social, political, and environmental effects of the rapid economic change set in motion in the Riau Islands; to what extent should the province seek to reconfigure its manufacturing-based economy; and how have the decentralization reforms implemented across Indonesia affected the Riau Islands.

Examines Islamic studies graduates who obtained their degrees from universities in the Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. The book identifies factors that condition the proliferation of Islamic studies graduates in Singapore, examines the religious institutions they attend, the nature of Islamic education they received, and their challenges.

The year 2021 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Cambodian Peace Agreements which ended the Cambodian conflict and the Cold War in Southeast Asia. The CPM waged a guerrilla war in Malaya. They were defeated by 1960 but tried to revive the insurgency in the 1970s.

Transboundary haze has been a recurring problem in the Southeast Asian region since at least 1982. Why does this toxic form of air pollution still persist? Helena Varkkey has been studying this multifaceted problem for more than fifteen years. This book is ideal for those who want a clear but concise introduction to this complex issue.

Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community.

Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism. Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system--regime change not excluded--to deal with Chinese threats. An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends. Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims. The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

During 2020, the Widodo government introduced a new Bill for parliamentary consideration. This was the Employment Creation Law. It was also known as the Omnibus Law as it introduced amendments to seventy-four other existing laws on a wide range of matters. The Bill provoked considerable controversy, especially provisions reducing protection of labour rights and weakening environmental protection laws. Several provisions introducing further deregulation of a range of activities also attracted criticism. The labour and environmental issues were the basis for a series of street protest mobilizations during the year. These also involved mobilizations where university students participated. The Law was justified by the government in its supplementary material to the legislation as a strategy to attain a specific growth rate in the gross domestic product and arguing that the revisions in the Law were necessary to substantially improve what was described as Ease of Doing Business. Despite the protests and criticism, the law was passed by a big majority in Parliament on 5 October 2020. All member parties of the governing coalition voted for the Bill, and it was signed into law by President Joko Widodo on 2 November 2020. The political journey of this Bill into Law revealed very clearly the homogeneity of the Indonesian political elite, represented by the parliamentary parties, all of whom either supported or acquiesced to the Law. It was also revealed that sustained and mobilized opposition to the Law was basically confined to a section of civil society, with some sections, including important large trade unions, campaigning in only a moderate and constrained way.

The Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) brought together Peninsular Malaya with the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. This Agreement afforded certain rights and obligations to these two states, notably in areas such as religion and language, financial autonomy, immigration, judicial autonomy, and finance and tax issues. However, since the signing of this foundational treaty, East Malaysians have become discontented. Key frustrations include a gradual erosion of the stipulated privileges by the federal government, persistent underdevelopment, as well as the perceived unequal distribution of petroleum revenue earned from these states. When Pakatan Harapan came to power in 2018, there were expectations from Sabah and Sarawak that the new administration would be committed to the restoration of East Malaysia's special position within the Malaysian Federation. In order to address long-standing tensions, Pakatan Harapan established a Special Cabinet Committee on MA63 to look for new ways of restoring East Malaysia's prerogatives. The Special Cabinet Committee managed to resolve seventeen out of twenty-one issues pertaining to the economy, finance and the judiciary. However, the most complex issues pertaining to the sharing of oil revenue were outstanding. One key outcome was that the Committee proposed a constitutional amendment to recognize Sabah, Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia as equal partners in the Federation. However, the proposed amendment did not garner the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament. A bloc of parliamentarians allied with the Gabungan Parti Sarawak--a coalition of Sarawak-based parties formerly aligned with ousted national coalition Barisan Nasional--abstained from voting. Since the advent of the Perikatan Nasional administration, the broader issue of East Malaysian rights has received little attention. It is likely that, rather than seeking to address the fundamental tensions between the Peninsula and East Malaysia, the current administration will seek to offer targeted benefits to elites from the region.

The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996 was due to the Malaysian government's initiative to tap into the ICT sector. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the knowledge economy, digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly over information flows.

Challenges facing Vietnam's export of fruits and vegetables to the Chinese market include technical barriers, long risk assessment periods, restrictions on products exported through official quotas to the Chinese market, and frequent changes in China's policy on border crossings.