Bøger udgivet af National Institute for Public Policy

The Great American Gamble examines the past, present, and prospective future of U.S. deterrence theory, strategic forces, nuclear weapons and policy. It provides a detailed explanation of the competing schools of deterrence theory that emerged during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Based on an extensive review of previously classified documents, it demonstrates how and why U.S. Government policies came to adhere to the guidelines established by the theory of deterrence popularly called the "balance of terror." Dr. Payne presents the assumptions, judgments and hopes that led U.S. policy makers in consecutive Republican and Democratic administrations to that choice. Acceptance of a balance of terror as official policy was challenged on occasion during the Cold War under both Democratic and Republican administrations, but it persisted as the lodestar for U.S. strategic policies. Most Americans presumed they were defended, but U.S. Government choices were predicated on the belief, as noted by Henry Kissinger, "that vulnerability contributed to peace, and invulnerability contributed to war." Looking forward, the key question is to what extent the basic tenets of Cold War academic deterrence theory provide useful guidance to contemporary strategic policy given contemporary threats and conditions? The conclusion offered herein is that familiar Cold War guidelines are a manifestly imprudent basis for U.S. policy. Much of what we believed we knew about deterrence during the Cold War now appears to have been more fleeting hope than wisdom.

Professor Keith Payne has written a bold analysis of our historical context that truly is a unique contribution to the American nuclear debate. His work here considers and describes most carefully what must be judged a global challenge to which there is no fully prudent solution. Russia is not going away anytime soon, though indeed already it is somewhat overshadowed by the large dragon to the East. In order to make sense clearly of what is happening, and why, Professor Payne makes admirable use of the familiar binary opposition of Realism and Idealism. He employs these for the keys they provide readily to help explain what otherwise typically is an unduly forbidding debate among experts.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced to a surprised world that it had decided to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as its longer-range missiles. Within hours, Prime Minister Blair and President Bush made separate but coordinated statements welcoming Tripoli's decision. Both made clear that Colonel Qadaffi had made this historic choice following months of secret contacts with the United States and United Kingdom. The author of The Libyan Experience, Ambassador Robert Joseph was at the center of this single most successful counterproliferation event of the decade. As the director of the National Security Council's counterproliferation activities, he was one of very few involved in, or even aware of, the secret face-to-face negotiations that preceded Libya's renunciation of its programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In fact, he headed the policy discussions with the Libyans that led to this historic and dramatic outcome. What occurred during those months has never before been made available publically or recorded in sufficient detail to answer key questions about Libyan motivations or to identify the lessons learned from this case that may apply to other proliferation challenges. In The Libyan Experience, Robert Joseph fills the void by providing this first hand account of the events that led to this great counterproliferation. Here is the actual history presented by a central figure involved in that success story. The narrative is both scholarly and highly-readable; at times it as much a real-life thriller as it is an historical text. As only a direct participant can, he describes the interactions with the Libyans and assesses their implications for both Tripoli's decision and for the future. This is the definitive, true story that now is told thanks to the author's intrepid work and to his meticulous, highly readable accounting and assessment of events. This is a story that is profoundly important to our understanding of proliferation and of the tools and processes most helpful to its prevention and rollback. As such, it is profoundly important to our future.