Bøger udgivet af Nimble Books

The Germans developed an innovative and audacious airborne operational capability, which they employed at the Battle of Crete, but ignored key principles of the offense in order to validate this new concept. By their inability to achieve surprise, concentrate their forces to realize a single purpose, and control the tempo of the attack to retain the initiative, the Germans paratroops were decimated, and only through air superiority and poor Allied leadership were they able to defeat the Allies. On 21 May, 1941 German paratroopers conducted an airborne invasion of the battle of Crete. Rather than being a part of a coherent strategy to defeat the Allies in the Mediterranean, this attack was merely an attempt for Hitler to shore up his southern flank before invading Russia. The author of the airborne plan, General Kurt Student, wanted to prove that airborne troops could be used operationally and drew up the plan to attack Crete with paratroopers and air landed elite mountain troops supported by seaborne reinforcements. Lacking proper resources to conduct the attack and with only three weeks to plan, Student developed a plan to attack the island at four widespread locations. He envisioned complete surprise and failed to make any contingency plans. The Allies defending Crete, having the benefit of intercepted German communications, were prepared for the attack, but lacked the necessary weapons and supplies to properly defend the island. Ten days later the Germans had captured the island, but at a cost of over 6,000 German troops and over 170 transport aircraft. In Student's rush to prove to the Fuhrer the operational benefit of an airborne force, he ignored key principles of the offense and thus destroyed the very force he advocated. In the end, it was the individual paratrooper that brought Student his victory, but at a terrible cost. Although this Promethean event was an operational and tactical victory for the Germans, it was a Pyrrhic one at best, and Crete would forever be known as the "graveyard of the Fallschirmjäger.

Leadership failures in the defense of Crete were essential factors contributing to Allied defeat on the island in May 1941. The Germans appeared unstoppable during the early stages of World War II. Inexperienced Allied forces were willing to fight, but the sentiment was the Germans were too powerful. Defeat became a foregone conclusion. To defend at all costs no longer appeared viable. Withdrawal and evacuation seemed almost commonplace in Allied strategy. Great Britain and Germany identified early in the war the strategic importance of the island of Crete for conducting military operations in the Mediterranean. Operationally the British maintained naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, while the German Luftwaffe ruled the skies. The Allies began defending Crete in November 1940. However, the Middle East Command put little effort into defending the island and changed Crete Force Commanders on a monthly basis. Allied intelligence uncovered the details of the German invasion plan for Crete. In a last ditch effort, forces evacuated from Greece were sent to Crete to bolster the defenses. This brought the total number of Allied defenders to 42,500 to repel an estimated enemy assault of 5,000 men. The German plan for the occupation of Crete, Operation MERCURY, called for gliders and Hitler's elite paratroops to conduct the largest airborne operation to date. The plan pitted 22,000 men and 1280 aircraft against an erroneously estimated enemy strength of 5,000 men. The success of this plan relied upon surprise and the paratroops securing one of the three airfields on the island so reinforcements could be flown in. A reluctant Crete Force Commander set the tone for subordinate commanders' leadership failures. The invasion began the morning of 20 May 1941. The Germans suffered heavy casualties. At the end of the first day of fighting, they were short ammunition, and the Allies maintained control of the airfields. However, the battalion commander defending the airfield at Maleme, lacking communications and situational awareness, was unaware of the success of his unit and that night mistakenly ordered its withdrawal from the airfield. The Germans occupied the airfield in the morning and reinforcements were flown in. The Allies conducted an attack the night of 21 May to retake the airfield, but poor Allied leadership at the Brigade and Division level resulted in failure. Consequently, the Germans were able to mass combat power on the island and defeat the Allies. The defenders outnumbered the attackers nearly 2 to 1, knew the invasion plan, and established their defense accordingly. By all accounts, the Allies should have defeated the Germans and in fact came quite close to doing so. However, failures in Allied leadership afforded the Germans opportunities that were quickly exploited. Subsequently, they were able to defeat the Allies within 12 days. Failure in Allied leadership, not overwhelming German combat power, was responsible for the Allied defeat on Crete.

For years, historians have dug into the archives, exploring the nuances of how the cold war was fought. But there is no substitute for the first-person testimony of the man who was there--in the pit--in the head-to-head confrontations in Moscow and Berlin and the Third World, in the decades when East and West struggled for supremacy. Kempton Jenkins was there at every turn; his memoir is a unique personal story as well as a valuable document in diplomatic history."-Ernest B. Furgueson, former Bureau Chief of the Baltimore Sun Moscow, Saigon and Washington, DC offices "As a Foreign Service veteran, I know a good FSO when I see one. Kempton Jenkins was one of the best (as he notes, at one point I tried to hire him). "Jenks'" voyage through a varied and stimulating career takes us from Asia to Berlin to Moscow to South America and to three different agencies, State, Commerce and USIA. Each assignment has its special challenges, which come to life under Kempton's facile pen. He highlights the issues and introduces the reader to the players, some good some bad. Yet Kempton demonstrates that our diplomacy worked; we more than coped. We shaped events. Reading his book is the closest you can become to being an FSO during an exciting and crucial period in our diplomacy."-Frank Carlucci "Cold War Saga provides a fascinating insider's view, enriched by personal experience. Jenkins' portraits of key cold war personalities, with whom he worked-Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Henry Kissinger, and Soviet Ambassador Dobryin-are especially revealing. A great read!- Helen Thomas To us veterans of the Cold War's diplomatic front lines, Kempton Jenkins tells it like it was. He names the key players, gives a keen insight into their character, and shows why some were heroes and some villains. Cold War Saga is an absorbing read. If you fought with Jenks in the political trenches it will stir fond memories. If you didn't, it will take you there, and you won't forget where you've been or what was at stake. -Jack F. Matlock, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1987-1991.

A unique dual biography of Daniel Defoe's ROBINSON CRUSOE and his real-life model Alexander Selkirk, history's most famous island castaways.