Bøger udgivet af US Naval Institute Press

For more than half of its existence, members of the Marine Corps largely self-identified as soldiers. It did not yet mean something distinct to be a Marine, either to themselves or to the public at large. As neither a land-based organization like the Army nor an entirely sea-based one like the Navy, the Corps' missions overlapped with both institutions. This work argues that the Marine Corps could not and would not settle on a mission, and therefore it turned to an image to ensure its institutional survival. The process by which a maligned group of nineteenth-century naval policemen began to consider themselves to be elite warriors benefited from the active engagement of Marine officers with the Corps' historical record as justification for its very being. Rather than look forward and actively seek out a mission that could secure their existence, late nineteenth-century Marines looked backward and embraced the past. They began to justify their existence by invoking their institutional traditions, their many martial engagements, and their claim to be the nation's oldest and proudest military institution. This led them to celebrate themselves as superior to soldiers and sailors. Although there are countless works on this hallowed fighting force, How the Few Became the Proud is the first to explore how the Marine Corps crafted such powerful myths.

Paul David Miller was born in Roanoke, Virginia on 1 December 1941 and spent his childhood years in Newport, Rhode Island and Norfolk, Virginia. He served in the United States Navy from 1964 to 1994, retiring on 31 October 1994 with the rank of admiral. Promoted to admiral (4-star) on 1 February 1991, his final active-duty billets included Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM).

From October 1864 to November 1865, the officers of the CSS Shenandoah carried the Confederacy and the conflict of the Civil War around the globe through extreme weather, alien surroundings, and the people they encountered. Her officers were the descendants of Deep South plantation aristocracy and Old Dominion first families: a nephew of Robert E. Lee, a grandnephew of founder George Mason, and descendants of one of George Washington's generals and of an aid to Washington. One was even an uncle of a young Theodore Roosevelt and another was son-in-law to Raphael Semmes. Shenandoah's mission-commerce raiding (guerre de course)-was a central component of U.S. naval and maritime heritage, a profitable business, and a watery form of guerrilla warfare. These Americans stood in defense of their country as they understood it, pursuing a difficult and dangerous mission in which they succeeded spectacularly after it no longer mattered. This is a biography of a ship and a cruise, and a microcosm of the Confederate-American experience.

After being wounded and awarded the Bronze Star for valor as a Marine infantry platoon commander in Vietnam, Arnold Punaro thought he'd left the battlefield behind. Instead, he redeployed onto the battlefield of Washington politics. For almost fifty years, he's toiled at the intersection of the political and defense establishments, working with such luminaries as Sam Nunn, John Glenn, John McCain, Colin Powell, Robert Gates, Ash Carter, and many others. Today Democrats, Republicans, and career public officials agree on one thing: few individuals possess the military experience, governmental expertise, and personal integrity of Arnold Punaro. Partnered with best-selling writer David Poyer, Punaro offers revelations about the most contentious issues of the past and sage advice for the future. From his military service, to his role formulating and overseeing all major defense and intelligence legislation, Punaro reveals how decisions are really made inside the Beltway, providing insights into the actions of presidents since Jimmy Carter and Secretaries of Defense back to James Schlesinger. Unsparing in his criticisms of both parties, whose partisanship is leading our country over a precipice, Punaro presents radical proposals for much-needed reform to save the country for which so many have given their lives.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike.On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

This remarkable collection of works by some of the most authoritative naval historians in the United States draws on many formerly classified sources to shed new light on the U.S. Navy's role in the three-year struggle to preserve the independence of the Republic of Korea. Several of the essays concentrate on fleet operations during the first critical year of the war and later years when United Nations forces fought a static war. Others focus on the leadership of Admirals Forrest P. Sherman, C. Turner Joy, James H. Doyle, and Arleigh A. Burke and on carrier-based and ground-based naval air operations as well as the contributions of African American Sailors.As a whole, this book documents how the Navy's domination of the seas around Korea enabled Allied forces to project combat power ashore the length and breadth of the Korean peninsula. It also shows how the powerful presence of U.S. and Allied naval forces discouraged China and the Soviet Union from launching other military adventures in the Far East, thus keeping the first limited war of the Cold War era confined to Korea. But far from being an aberration unlikely to be replicated, the Korean War proved to be only the first in a long line of twentieth-century and early twenty-first century conflicts involving U.S. naval forces confronting Communist and nontraditional adversaries, and a full understanding of the Korean War experience, as provided in this book, helps define the role of sea power in today's world.

U.S. Marines have been sent to Haiti many times since 1800, including as recently as 1995, but one of the most intriguing operations has--until now--been the least known. The 1959-63 mission exposed America's Cold War domino theory to the quagmire of Third World political tyranny. This revealing firsthand account of the operation is a tale of good intentions gone bad. Charles Williamson offers a captivating and instructive look back at America stumbling toward costly foreign adventures and policies that continue to challenge the nation today.Here for the first time is the full story of a mission, which included the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, that quickly became embroiled in Haiti's mystifying brew of intrigue, conspiracy, secret cabals, coups, and double-cross. All of this was linked to President Papa Doc Duvalier's manipulation of his country and people--and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. An original member of the mission, the author consulted surviving records and interviewed American and Haitian participants to finally uncover the truth about such provocative stories as U.S. Marines fighting Castro-led Cuban invasion forces and covertly supporting military coup attempts. Williamson also presents previously unreported accounts of American men and women risking their lives to help Haitians being hunted and murdered by Duvalier's Tonton Macoute death squads.By so effectively portraying the human costs of one of America's first foreign policy failures of the Cold War, Williamson has given us a timely and very readable warning about future uses of the military in operations short of war.

Most Americans regard the postwar Occupation of Japan as a prime example of American magnanimity. They are blithely unaware of the prevailing Japanese myth that upon entering Japan, U.S. servicemen "engaged in an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling" and that during the first ten days of the Occupation there were 1,336 reported cases of rape in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. The myth goes further with claims that U.S. military officers demanded the Japanese government set up brothels for use by American troops and that when embarrassed officials in Washington, D.C., forced Occupation officials to close the brothels, the servicemembers went on a rampage, resulting in (according to official records) reported rapes of Japanese women skyrocketing from an average of 40 to 330 cases a day.   The truth is that none of this happened. Nevertheless, large numbers of Japanese still believe these allegations. As the passions of war have faded, the currency of such stories has only grown, and they are now regarded by many as fact. This false narrative of mass sexual violence and the organized exploitation of Japanese women by American military forces is also widely accepted among historians of World War II and its aftermath.   > Walsh sets the records straight, by showing that MacArthur's General Headquarters established women's rights on a more secure foundation than anywhere else in East Asia, provided a far safer physical environment than most other occupations, and all but eliminated endemic sexually transmitted diseases. These diseases ruined millions of lives, prematurely ending as many as five thousand per year, including those of more than a thousand children. The "Rape" of Japan is a long-overdue refutation and exposure of a relentless propaganda campaign that has persisted for more than seven decades.

"When Lt. Cdr. Waldo Drake, USNR arrived in Pearl Harbor in June 1941 as the U.S. Pacific Fleet's first Public Relations Officer (PRO), he was an admired maritime reporter for the Los Angeles Times and Reserve Officer appointed to intelligence duties. By October 1944, he was hated by most of the correspondents assigned to cover the war against Japan and seen by officials in Washington as an obstacle to the development of Navy public relations. What led Drake to become the Pacific Fleet's first PRO, what happened during the three years he served on the CINCPAC staff, and why he was removed from that position are the focus of Nimitz's Newsman: Waldo Drake and the Navy's Censored War in the Pacific. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Adm. Chester Nimitz, USN assumed command of the Pacific Fleet and inherited Drake's services. Drake became responsible for informing America's press about the Pacific Fleet's wartime role and thus gained an outsized ability to influence American public opinion. The Navy's decision to allow public relations officers to censor press copy caused numerous conflicts between Drake and the correspondents assigned to the Fleet. It was Drake's love for the Navy, his tendency to take on every job himself, and above all his close relationship with Adm. Nimitz that allowed him to perform censorship duties with approval. Drake's protection of Nimitz, and his reticence to give the press any information that could endanger operational security or dampen morale, caused Navy victories to go under-reported-much to the consternation of officials in Washington. In analyzing the dynamics of Drake and Nimitz's relationship, and in highlighting Drake's interactions with correspondents and Navy officials, Nimitz's Newsman reveals the inside story of the Navy's censored war in the Pacific during World War II. "--

"The United States is in the midst of a new cold war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and America is losing. That claim, at the core of Michael Sobolik's new book Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance, challenges the Washington, D.C. conventional wisdom about U.S.-China relations. Officials in Washington are reacting to the CCP and playing defense. Like America's efforts to contain the Soviet Union in the twentieth-century Cold War, the United States needs a strategic vision to overcome the CCP. Sobolik offers a plan for American victory over the CCP and presents a roadmap to sabotage the crux of the CCP's foreign policy: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At its core, the BRI is not an economic venture. It is a geopolitical gambit. Chinese leader Xi Jinping's "project of the century" has entered its second phase: leveraging yesterday's investments for today's political and military ends. Xi will never do away with the BRI because it is strengthening Beijing's strategic position from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to Africa and Latin America. The BRI is the apotheosis of the CCP's grand strategy. America needs a blueprint to take it down. Sobolik provides this blueprint by identifying the BRI's core weakness: imperial overstretch. After identifying China's penchant for empire-building, he identifies the BRI's key weaknesses globally and traces them back to the CCP's vulnerabilities at home. Sobolik's work offers policymakers a plan to go on the offense and win America's new cold war"--

"With updates to every chapter, this new fourth edition serves as the premier guide to professional writing for the naval services. Authored by a naval officer who taught English at two service academies, the book is widely used by officers, enlisted men and women and civilians in both the Navy and Marine Corps. Shenk provides sound, practical advice on all common naval writing assignments across digital and print platforms. Fully revised, the book reflects the changing landscape of professional communication in general and changes in naval culture in the last decade across the fleet, making it an essential guide"--

"Stavridis' story, while fascinating of its own accord, is far more valuable as an example for future leaders, not only in the Navy and military, but for those wishing to achieve, prosper, and excel in any endeavor"--

"This book provides readers with an in-depth understanding of the professional development of two notable and highly accomplished naval officers and their contributions to the development of the Aegis Weapons System. The main argument is that there was no single career path or set of formal qualifications for achieving excellence in the naval profession as characterized by selection for Flag rank. One of the major points is the revelation that a combination of essential personal traits and qualities and important operational and technical experiences fundamental to the nature of naval warfare are critical to developing highly competent and confident officers. Such officers are needed to lead major acquisition programs capable of delivering innovative weapons systems for a twenty-first century Navy facing new age threats"--

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet Union forced America's armed forces to redefine themselves and codify their role as a key element of national power. New threats and emerging technologies changed the very character of war and demanded new strategies and an adaptable military to address them. Jason Q. Bohm began his service to our nation as a Marine at the start of this tumultuous era. He takes the reader on a journey from the turbulent times at the end of the Cold War through the current fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Bohm provides candid and useful historical background as, through a series of personal vignettes and rich operational experience, he describes how Marines translated strategic and operational objectives into tactical actions. In this unique way, he not only tells his story but that of the Marine Corps, and provides an invaluable look at the challenging times confronting Marines.

The second edition of Sea Power presents a complete history of the world's navies from antiquity to the present. From the opening chapter on galley warfare, through a section on Japanese naval history, to the rise and decline of the British navy and the rise and temporary decline of the American navy, readers will find a broad and colorful tapestry woven by respected naval historians.The book focuses on the influences of sea power upon history as well as on naval operations - strategy, tactics, and logistics. It gives due consideration to changes in naval weapons and the administrative reforms brought about because of them. Sea Power is a lively history in which the personalities that shaped events stand out as sharply as the events themselves.

"It is unclear if U.S. policy makers and military leaders fully realize that we have already been thrust into an artificial intelligence (AI) race with authoritarian powers. Today, the United States' peer adversaries-China and Russia-have made clear their intentions to make major investments in AI and insert this technology into their military systems, sensors and weapons. Their goal is to gain an asymmetric advantage over the U.S. military. The implications for our national security are many and complex. Algorithms of Armageddon examines this most pressing security issue in a clear, insightful delivery by two experts. Authors George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi are national security professionals who deal with AI on a day-to-day basis in their work in both the technical and policy arenas. Opening chapters explain the fundamentals of what constitutes big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. They investigate the convergence of AI with other technologies and how these systems will interact with humans. Critical to the issue is the manner by which AI is being developed and utilized by Russia and China. The central chapters of the work address the weaponizing of AI through interaction with other technologies, man-machine teaming, and autonomous weapons systems. The authors cover in depth debates surrounding the AI "genie out of the bottle" controversy, AI arms races, and the resulting impact on policy and the laws of war. Given that global powers are leading large-scale development of AI, it is likely that use of this technology will be global in extent. Will AI-enabled military weapons systems lead to full-scale global war? Can such a conflict be avoided? The later chapters of the work explore these questions, point to the possibility of humans failing to control military AI applications, and conclude that the dangers for the United States are real. Neither a protest against AI, nor a speculative work on how AI could replace humans, Algorithms of Armageddon provides a time-critical understanding of why AI is being implemented through state weaponization, the realities for the global power balance, and more importantly, U.S. national security. Galdorisi and Tangredi propose a national dialogue that focuses on the need for U.S. military to have access to the latest AI-enabled technology in order to provide security and prosperity to the American people"--

Britain's War for the Mediterranean provides a definitive study on British warmaking in the Mediterranean during the War of the First Coalition. It traces the origins of foreign and naval policies from the early eighteenth century to describe the duality of British affairs. These contradictions manifested themselves in the War of the First Coalition as Great Britain attempted to build consensus in the Mediterranean World while clinging to its power base of naval power and commerce. The book explores the decisions of individuals and the wider trends of the British political and naval system, honed over the course of the eighteenth century. In explaining war against Revolutionary France, the book follows the decisions of admirals, diplomats, and politicians in attempting to cobble together a coalition of Spanish, Austrian, Sardinian, and Neapolitan forces. This book also makes connections with the other theaters of war: The Austrian Netherlands and the Caribbean. Britain's War for the Mediterranean examines the internal working of the British government during the crisis of the French Revolution. It focuses on how politicians, diplomats, and military commanders formulated strategy for the Mediterranean theater. One of the major conclusions of this book is that the British government never spoke with one voice. Lacking synchronization in a changing conflict, the structure and conflicting objectives of each branch of the government failed to create a coherent plan to resist Republican expansion in the region. The book complicates the simplistic view of previous works on the weakness of allies and the naivete of the Pitt ministry, providing agency to diplomats and commanders across the region. The second major conclusion is that these conflicting objectives were firmly rooted in the experiences of the eighteenth century. British diplomacy, crippled in the aftermath of the American Revolution, saw the French Revolution as an opportunity to build consensus and a shared view of a British world. French aggression offered an opportunity to reclaim a position of influence lost over the course of the 1700s. In contrast, the trajectory of British foreign policy shaped the use of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century. A trans-Atlantic force, a war in the Mediterranean forced British admirals to relearn the complicated nature of regional foreign policy. Diplomacy and naval power clashed over the conduct of the war - one rooted in foreign courts, the other in maritime coercion.

"This volume answers the question "why did the United States become a naval power?" Combining economic and political history, John Fass Morton looks at the movements, events, and processes that strengthened the nation's seagoing fighting force, with an emphasis on the years between the end of the Civil War and the end of World War I"--

"Urban Battlefields: Lessons Learned from World War II to the Modern Era offers a detailed study of the complexities of urban operations, demonstrating through historical conflicts their key features, the various weapons and tactics employed by both sides, and the factors that contributed to success or failure. Urban operations are a relatively recent phenomenon and an increasingly prominent feature of today's operational environment, typified by on-going fighting in Syria and Iraq. Here, Gregory Fremont-Barnes has enlisted ten experts to examine the key elements that characterize this particularly costly and difficult method of fighting by focusing on notable examples across the modern era. He covers their nineteenth-century roots, and follows with case studies ranging from major conventional formations to counterinsurgency and civil resistance. The contributors analyze the distinct features of urban warfare, which separate it from fighting in open areas, particularly the three-dimensional nature of the operating environment. These include: the restricted fields of fire and view; the substantial advantages conferred on the defender as a result of concealed positions and ubiquitous cover; the often- abundant presence of subterranean features including cellars, tunnels, and drainage and sewer systems; and the recurrent problems imposed by snipers holding up the progress of troops many times their number. Further, the authors consider how the presence of civilians may influence the rules of engagement and also may provide an advantage to the defender. Urban Battlefields illustrates why warfare in metropolises can be protracted and costly. It also illustrates why modest numbers of soldiers, militia, or insurgents with nothing more than shoulder-borne anti-tank weapons or ground-to-air missile systems, small arms, and improvised explosive devices can drastically reduce the effectiveness of much better disciplined, trained, and armed adversaries. Furthermore, it explains how those short-term advantages can be neutralized and ultimately overcome. "--

"This manuscript addresses a major aspect of 21st century sea power; analyzing the integration of women into the operating forces of the United States Navy. It delineates the cultural, economic, political conditions and technological changes that shaped the integration of women into the Navy over the course of a century. It also draws extensively upon the archives of the Naval Institute's professional journal Proceedings"--

As the Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Frank McKenzie oversaw some of the most important - and controversial operations in modern U.S. military history. He had direct operational responsibility for the strikes on Qassem Soleimani and two successive leaders of ISIS, the many months of deterrence operations against Iran and its proxies, and the methodical drawdown in Iraq. He directed the noncombatant evacuation operation in Afghanistan, and our final withdrawal from that tortured country. The Melting Point has three themes. The first one is the importance of the primacy of civilian control of the military. It has become a widely perceived truth that this control has been eroded over the past few years. General McKenzie doesn't believe that to be the case, and he speaks with some authority on the matter arguing that the civ-mil relationship isn't perfect or frictionless, but it doesn't have to be, and probably shouldn't be. It is, however, more durable than many believe, and is supported and embraced by the military to a degree that some critics do not choose to recognize. The second theme is the uniqueness of being a combatant commander. Combatant commanders participate in the development of policy, although as junior partners. They are also responsible for the execution of policy once civilian leaders have formulated their decision, a unique position, and very different than the role of a service chief, or even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these officers are in the chain of command, and they have no ultimate, mortal responsibility or authority for execution. Only the combatant commander stands astride the boundary of decision-making and execution. Finally, the third theme that McKenzie argues is that leaders matter, and the decisions they make have a profound effect on what happens on the battlefield. McKenzie provides an honest assessment of his time in command-describing decisions that were sound, as well as some outcomes he wishes were different. He offers a vivid portrait of leadership in action in one of the most volatile regions of the world.