Matching with Transfers

"A unique blend of theory with applications--many exposed here in book form for the first time. Chiappori's text is a valuable contribution to the matching literature, written by one of the subject's leading authorities."--Robert J. McCann, University of Toronto"This book gives a concise and insightful discussion of the economics of matching when potential partners can make transfers to each other. It synthesizes and extends a vibrant new literature on the economics of marriage and the household that Chiappori pioneered. It is a must-read for any serious student of the economics of the family."--James J. Heckman, University of Chicago, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics"This incredibly important book defines the state of knowledge for matching models with transfers, and provides a set of tools for analyzing matching patterns in equilibrium. This is a growing area in empirical economics with a number of applications, including marriage and labor markets. To my knowledge, no other book covers this material. This is an excellent and extremely useful book."--Costas Meghir, Yale University"This encompassing overview of marital matching models will provide a very useful starting point for readers who want to understand the state of the art of research on the subject. Very instructively written, with much emphasis on intuition, it naturally links deep theoretical insights with observed empirical relationships. By focusing on matching issues in the family context, it offers a welcome addition to our understanding of family economics."--Laurens Cherchye, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven