pandemic injustice

"Epistemic injustice" is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world, and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990's, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. 3 However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood. While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely, if at all defined, and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice being left unclear. This is left unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker's account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what I will call the "Frickerian account", there has been a general failure to satisfactorily recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account